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1. Introduction 
 
Holding enough capital allows banks to absorb losses, to be more solvent and therefore 
avoid bankruptcy. Capital requirements have hence become an essential tool to regulate banks 
by providing cushion during episodes of adverse financial conditions and by preventing banks 
from taking excessive risk ex ante. More specifically, during the global financial crisis of 2007-
2009, systemic liquidity risk was a major contributor to bank failure as documented by Hong 
et al. 2014. Thus, while capital ratios are considered in the literature as an essential tool to 
reduce the risk of bank failure, systemic liquidity risk, which translates into a widespread 
market liquidity shortage, can also play a major role in triggering distress. Banks are therefore 
expected to take action during times of liquidity shortage by adjusting their balance sheets to 
improve their internal liquidity and namely their capital ratios to increase their financial 
strength. Banks could either downsize their overall activity to achieve lower leverage or 
substitute liquid assets to loans to improve their internal liquidity.  
In this paper, we investigate how banks react in terms of capital structure adjustment to 
sharper conditions on the market leading to liquidity shortages. We capture episodes of such 
market liquidity shortages by sudden and sharp increases in commercial paper rates and 
specifically the TED spread, i.e. the difference between the three-month LIBOR and the three-
month T-bill interest rates. Although there is an extent literature focusing on the determinants 
of bank capital structure adjustment (e.g. Cohen and Scatigna, 2016; De Jonghe and Öztekin, 
2015; Lepetit et al., 2015; Öztekin and Flannery, 2012; Memmel and Raupach, 2010; Berger et 
al., 2008) and a literature focusing on the relationship between capital and bank liquidity (see 
e.g. DeYoung et al., 2018; Castiglionesi et al., 2014; De Haan and Van Den End, 2013; 
Distinguin et al., 2013), how liquidity shortages affect the adjustment process remains an open 
question.  
To figure out the different channels by which market liquidity shortages may impact banks’ 
capital structure adjustment, we distinctively investigate the effect of such shortages on four 
aspects:  first, on the share of risk weighted assets in total assets (substitution effect); second, 
on the share of loans in total assets (impact on lending); third, on total assets (possible 
downsizing) and fourth, on dividends (possible earnings retention).  We also account for banks’ 
degree of reliance on market liquidity. Indeed, banks that hold less liquid assets or with higher 
maturity mismatch between assets and liabilities may be differently affected by a liquidity 
shortage on the market than other banks. Their stronger reliance on market liquidity could urge 
them to take stronger actions to adjust their balance sheets. Moreover, banks operating below 
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their target capital ratios might also behave differently than banks operating above their target. 
Such banks are expected to be under stronger pressure to adjust to their target. Eventually, 
because they are financially more constrained than large banks, small banks might also adjust 
differently.   
 The literature on the impact of market liquidity breakdowns on banks is scarce and the 
papers related to our study are far from being conclusive. Castiglionesi et al. (2014) show 
theoretically and empirically that banks facing undiversifiable liquidity risk, i.e. liquidity risk 
that banks cannot coinsure on interbank markets, tend to hold higher capital. In their setting 
banks less active on the interbank market hold higher capital. Meanwhile, Gatev and Strahan 
(2006) document a natural hedging behavior of banks against liquidity risk. They find that, 
during a liquidity disruption episode on the commercial paper market, bank deposits tend to 
grow. They argue that, during such episodes, because they are looking for a safe place, investors 
withdraw funds from markets and inject them into the banking system. In such a case, leverage 
would increase and banks would need to adjust their capital ratios to get closer to their target 
ratio. However, such a behavior is challenged by other studies. For instance, Pennacchi (2006) 
does not find any inflow of funds at banks during the pre-Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC) period. This may be evidence that such inflows are caused by the 
government guarantees. 
In our investigation, we use U.S. commercial banks' data over the 2000-2014 period and 
find only small banks to positively adjust their capital ratios when facing liquidity shortages on 
the market. Large banks neither increase nor decrease their capital ratios.  Small banks 
positively adjust their capital ratios by reducing the share of loans in total assets, by decreasing 
the share of assets with higher risk weights, by restricting dividend payments and by downsizing 
their overall balance sheets. Our results also indicate that the extent to which small banks adjust 
their capital ratios when facing difficulties in accessing liquidity is not uniform. Less liquid 
small banks and small banks operating below their target capital ratios react more strongly than 
other small banks. By investigating whether market liquidity shortages impact banks’ capital 
structure adjustment we contribute to both the capital structure adjustment literature and the 
banking literature. More specifically, we present empirical evidence that market liquidity 
shortage is an important determinant of bank capital structure adjustment. To our knowledge, 
this is the first paper that investigates such an issue which is of major importance for bank 
regulation. Our findings indicate that liquidity requirements imposed at the individual bank 
level as defined in Basel III might not be necessary for small banks but appear to be crucial for 
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large banks. This is because small banks take action to improve their solvency when facing a 
liquidity shortage on the market, which is not the case of large banks.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  In section 2, we present our data and 
the methodology and section 3 discusses the results. Section 4 looks at further issues and section 
5 provides robustness checks. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Data and Methodology 
2.1. Presentation of the sample 
We obtain the data used in this study from two different sources. We extract data to compute 
our measures of market liquidity shortage and data on GDP from the federal reserve bank of St 
Louis2. Data on balance sheets and income statements come from SNL Financial. We use a 
sample consisting of an unbalanced panel of quarterly data from 2000 to 2014 for U.S. 
commercial banks which includes 10053 banks making 438,608 bank-quarter observations. 
These banks are the ones that provide information on their total assets on at least one quarter in 
our investigation period and have a total capital ratio higher than the minimum level required 
by regulation (8%). We exclude banks with a total capital ratio under the minimum required 
level because they might behave differently than their peers and disturb our analysis. Such 
banks would obviously be under regulatory pressure to enhance their capital ratio. We also split 
our sample into two subsamples of small and large banks. Following the literature, we consider 
banks with total assets higher than $1 billion to be large and small banks are those with total 
assets lower or equal to $1 billion. To deal with the issue of possible outliers, we winsorize our 
variables at the 2nd and 98th percentiles.   
 
2.2. Definition of variables 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate if market liquidity shortages affect banks’ capital 
structure adjustment and the channels through which capital ratios are affected.  
2.2.1. Total capital ratio 
Our main dependent variable is the total capital ratio. The total capital ratio is the sum 
of Tier 1 capital and Tier 2 capital divided by total risk weighted assets. Tier 1 capital is the 
bank’s core capital. It includes equity and published reserves while Tier 2 capital mainly 
                                               
2 See http://research.stlouisfed.org/ 
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includes subordinated debt and undisclosed reserves. We also use the Tier 1 capital ratio as an 
alternative dependent variable for robustness checks. 
2.2.2. Proxies of market liquidity shortage 
We use two different interest spreads to proxy market liquidity shortage.  
Firstly, we follow Hong et al. (2014), Rodríguez-Moreno and Peña (2013), Wu and 
Hong (2012) and Cornett et al. (2011) and use the TED spread. Cornett et al. (2011) use the 
TED spread to measure liquidity strains on the banking system while Wu and Hong (2012) and 
Hong et al. (2014) use it to measure systemic liquidity risk. Rodríguez-Moreno and Peña (2013) 
use it to, more broadly, proxy systemic risk. The TED spread is the difference between the 
three-month London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) and the three-month Treasury bills rate. 
It is used as a gauge of financial health. LIBOR is the unsecured interest rate on interbank loans 
and allows to perceive liquidity constraints and stress on the interbank market while the 
Treasury bill rates provide information about changes in macroeconomic conditions and 
monetary policy. In addition, because during periods of stress only government securities are 
accepted as collateral, Treasury bill rates tend to decrease.  Therefore, in addition to information 
on liquidity risk and credit risk, the TED spread reflects flight-to-quality effects. Secondly, for 
robustness checks, we follow Gatev and Strahan (2006) and use the commercial paper spread. 
Gatev and Strahan (2006) use spikes in the commercial paper spread to measure financial 
market disruptions. The commercial paper spread is a spread between the three-month 
commercial paper rate for highly rated (AA) non-financial borrowers and the three-month 
Treasury bills rate. Commercial paper is an unsecured, short-term debt instrument (up to 270 
days of maturity) issued by investment-grade corporations.  
Spikes in both proxies (TED spread and commercial paper spread) highlight liquidity 
disruptions in the market. We therefore create a dummy variable !"#$ based on either the TED 
spread or the commercial paper spread. The dummy variable is equal to one if the observation 
is above its 75th percentile throughout the entire sample period and zero otherwise. We assume 
that spikes beyond the 75th percentile underline liquidity disruptions on the market. To check 
for robustness, we also use alternative thresholds (the 90th percentile and the mean plus two 
times the standard deviation). 
2.2.3. Extent of reliance on market liquidity 
During periods of liquidity stress, banks with lower liquidity ratios might behave 
differently than banks which are less reliant on the market. To gauge the extent to which banks 
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are dependent on the market, we follow the Basel III principles and compute the Net Stable 
Funding Ratio (NSFR) using the weights defined in DeYoung and Jang (2016)3.  The Net Stable 
Funding Ratio is a liquidity standard established in 2010 by the Committee on Banking 
Supervisory (BCBS) to strengthen bank stability. It is calculated by dividing the amount of 
available stable funding by the amount of required stable funding. It can be defined as the 
proportion of long-term assets funded by long term or stable funding. Fully implemented since 
January 2019, banks need to set this ratio at a minimum of 100% to maintain a stable funding 
profile enabling them to sustain a liquidity crisis. In our investigation, we assume that less liquid 
banks are those whose NSFR is below 100%. Therefore, to capture such banks, we define a 
dummy variable %&,$ that is equal to one if bank i has a NSFR lower than 100% at time t and 
zero if otherwise.  
 For robustness checks, we also use an alternative threshold for NSFR (10th percentile) 
and three alternative variables to proxy banks’ liquidity level. We use the loans to core deposits 
ratio assuming that banks with more than 100% of this ratio, are more exposed to liquidity 
shortages on the market. We also use the liquid assets to total assets ratio and we assume that 
banks that are below the 25th percentile (12.85%) of this ratio, are less liquid banks. Finally, we 
account for the extent to which banks rely on wholesale funding. We use the proxy of reliance 
on wholesale funding defined in SNL Financial. This proxy is calculated by dividing the sum 
of total borrowings and brokered deposits by the sum of total borrowings and total deposits. It 
depicts the portion of a bank’s total funds that are from wholesale sources. We assume that 
banks are strongly reliant on wholesale funding if they are above the 75th percentile (12.35%) 
of this proxy.   
 
2.2.4. Banks’ capital ratio target 
When facing a market liquidity squeeze, banks operating below their target total capital 
ratio may take stronger action to increase their capital ratio than banks operating above their 
target ratio. We therefore account for whether a bank is below or above its target capital ratio.  
 We model the target capital ratio as a function of banks' observable characteristics (e.g. 
De Jonghe and Öztekin, 2015 and Lepetit et al. 2015; Gropp and Heider, 2010; Lemmon et 
al.,2008; Flannery and Rangan, 2006): 
 
()*&,$
∗ = b	.&,$/0  (1) 
                                               
3 see APPENDIX K for detailed components.  
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where ()*&,$
∗  is the target total capital ratio; .&,$/0 is a vector of variables that determine the 
target level of the total capital ratio. The vector includes a dummy for market liquidity shortage, 
a dummy for mergers and acquisition, the GDP growth rate to account for macroeconomic 
factors that impact all banks, proxies for banks' performance (return on assets), credit risk (non-
performing loans to total loans), liquidity (NSFR) and size (natural logarithm of total assets). b 
is the vector of coefficients of the variables included in .&,$/0. 
Banks cannot adjust their capital ratio instantaneously and need time to reach the target level. 
Thus, we build a partial adjustment framework to take the cost of adjustment into account: 
 
D()*&,$ = l1()*&,$∗ − ()*&,$/03 + e&,$    (2) 
 
where λ is a scalar adjustment speed (0 < λ < 1) and ()*&,$
∗  is the target capital ratio of bank i  
at time t. Substituting equation (1) into equation (2) and rearranging give the following 
estimation model: 
 
()*&,$ = lb.&,$/0 + (1 − l)()*&,$/0 + e&,$    (3) 
 
Equation (3) includes the lagged dependent variable. Nickell (1981) shows that the presence of 
the lag dependent variable generates correlation between the regressor and the error term which 
leads to a bias in the coefficient estimates, which will be inconsistent (Shim, 2012). To fix this 
problem, Arellano and Bond (1991), Anderson and Hsiao (1982) and Blundell and Bond (1998) 
propose General Method of Moment (GMM) estimation procedures. However, when the time 
dimension T is relatively large, the bias becomes insignificant (Roodman, 2006, 2009) and the 
standard estimation procedures are asymptotically valid (kiviet, 1995). For instance, when the 
time dimension T is greater than 30, Judson and Owen (1999) document that fixed effects 
estimators perform better than GMM estimators. Loutskina (2011) indicates that the bias 
becomes problematic when T falls below 15 time periods. Our investigation period stems from 
2000Q1 to 2014Q4 making 60 time periods. Therefore, like other studies such as Kim and Sohn 
(2017) and Berrospide and Edge (2010), we use fixed effect estimations after performing 
Hausman tests which validate the use of fixed effects versus random effects. Finally, we cluster 
standard errors at the bank level (see APPENDIX A for results). We recover b by dividing lb8  
by  l9   and we recover l9  from 1 − l: . We can then use equation (1) to compute the estimated 
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target total capital ratio for each bank i at time t. We use the estimated target capital ratio to 
compute the capital ratio deviation as follows: 
 
;<=&,$/0 = ()*&,$
∗ −	()*&,$/0   (4) 
 
Banks operating below their target capital ratio are the ones with a positive gap. To capture 
such banks, we create a dummy variable that is equal to one if ;<=&,$/0 > 0 and zero if 
otherwise. For robustness checks, we follow the same procedure to capture banks operating 
below the level of the Tier 1 capital ratio they target. 
 
2.2.5. Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 presents the definitions and descriptive statistics of all the variables used in this 
investigation. The TED spread and the commercial paper spread, on average over the sample 
period, are respectively 0.46% and 0.33% with relatively high standard deviations4. The lowest 
value of the total capital ratio in our sample is 9.84% and the lowest value of the estimated 
target total capital ratio is 8.73%, which is higher than the minimum regulatory requirement 
consistent with the fact that banks' targets include buffers to prevent them from falling below 
the threshold in case of negative shocks and possibly face regulatory sanctions. On average, the 
ratio of liquid assets to total assets is equal to 24.32% and the NSFR is around 84% which is 
below the 100% that banks need to comply with. On average, the loans to core deposits ratio 
and the portion of wholesale funding in total funding are 78.44% and 8.23% respectively. On 
average, banks grew in size during our investigation period. Their balance sheets are also 
dominated by risky assets. The mean of risk-weighted assets over total assets is 67.71%.  The 
correlation matrix (Appendix J) does not indicate major collinearity issues.  
 
[insert table 1, graph 1 & graph 2] 
 
 
2.3. Empirical specifications 
Since the aim of this study is to investigate whether market liquidity shortage impacts 
banks' capital structure adjustment, we use an adjustment model. We observe at time t, a change 
                                               
4 See graph 1 and graph 2. 
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in bank i's capital ratio and link it to a market liquidity shortage occurring at time t-1.  The total 
capital ratio can be increased by increasing capital (numerator) and/or decreasing risk weighted 
assets (denominator). To increase capital, a bank can either issue equity or increase retained 
earnings by reducing dividend payments. However, the cost of capital may be higher during 
liquidity squeezes and furthermore issuing capital may also be interpreted as a bad signal and 
generate a decrease in the bank’s value (see Myers and Majluf, 1984). Banks might therefore 
be reluctant to issue equity during such episodes5. Hence, to figure out the different channels in 
which market liquidity shortage may impact U.S. commercial banks’ total capital ratio, we 
study the effect of such shortage on 1/ the change in the share of risk weighted assets in total 
assets, 2/ the change in the share of loans in total assets, 3/ the change in total assets and 4/ 
dividend payments to total assets6. Banks could increase their total capital ratio by restricting 
dividend payouts, changing the composition of their assets to reduce the level of risk weighted 
assets, selling assets or reducing loans (downsizing). The empirical specifications are therefore 
given by: 
 
@&.$ = 	B& + 	x$ + C0!"#$/0 + CD%&,$/0 	+ CEFGHHI_KLM&,$/0
+ CN(%&,$/0 ∗ !"#$/0) + CO&.$/0 + 	P&.$ (5) 
 
 
@&.$ = 	g& + 	q$ + w0!"#$/0 + wD%&,$/0 	+ wEFGHHI_KLM&,$/0
+ wN(FGHHI_KLM&,$/0 ∗ !"#$/0) + wO&.$/0 + 	µ&.$ (6) 
 
where @&.$ is either the change in the total capital ratio, the change in the share of risk weighted 
assets in total assets, the change in the share of loans in total assets, the change in total assets 
or the dividend to total assets ratio; 	B& and 	g&	 are individual bank fixed effects and 	x$ and 	q$ 
are time fixed effects;  !"#$/0 is a dummy variable that is equal to one if throughout the whole 
period, the TED spread is higher than its 75th percentile at time t-1 and zero if  otherwise, %&,$/0	 
is a dummy variable that is equal to one if bank i is more reliant on market liquidity at time t-1 
and  zero if  otherwise; FGHHI_KLM&,$/0 is a dummy variable equal to one if ;<=&,$/0 > 0 and 
zero if otherwise; O&.$/0	is a vector of bank specific variables for bank i at time t-1. It includes 
                                               
5 We investigate the impact of market liquidity shortages on the quarterly growth rate of equity and do not find 
significant results. 
6 We also use the ratio of dividends to net income and the ratio of retained earnings to total assets and obtain 
similar findings. 
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the GDP growth rate to capture the business cycle, bank size proxied by the natural logarithm 
of total assets, the return on assets to account for banks' performance, the ratio of non-
performing loans to total loans to measure risk in the bank's loan portfolio and a dummy to 
control for the effect of mergers and acquisitions. This dummy variable is equal to one if a 
bank's total assets grow by more than 10% during a given quarter and zero if otherwise. 
C0	 captures the impact of market liquidity shortages on the dependent variable for 
banks less reliant on market liquidity. We expect it to be either non-significant or significant 
and positive. Indeed, since their bank holds more liquidity or is less exposed to maturity 
transformation risk, managers may not feel concerned by the liquidity shortage on the market 
and therefore they may not take action to adjust their total capital ratio and balance sheets more 
generally. In that case, C0	 will be non-significant. However, if these managers are very 
cautious, they may increase their total capital ratio. In that case, C0 is expected to be positive 
and significant when the dependent variable is the change in the total capital ratio. 
w0	gives the impact of market liquidity shortages on the dependent variable for banks 
operating above their target capital ratio. We also expect it to be either non-significant or 
significant and positive. Indeed, the managers of banks operating above their target capital ratio 
may not adjust their capital ratio and balance sheet because they might feel safe and already 
well capitalized. In that case w0	will be non-significant. However, if the managers of such banks 
are very cautious, they may adjust their capital ratio positively. In that case, w0 is expected to 
be positive and significant when the dependent variable is the change in the total capital ratio. 
CD and wD capture the impact on the dependent variable of banks’ reliance on market 
liquidity in the absence of a market liquidity shortage.  CD  and wD are expected to be positive, 
when the dependent variable is the change in the total capital ratio, because stronger reliance 
on market liquidity leads banks to increase their capital ratio to exhibit higher solvency to more 
easily borrow from the market. As documented by DeYoung et al. (2018), U.S. commercial 
banks treat liquidity and regulatory capital as substitutes. Distinguin et al. (2013) also find that 
small U.S. banks increase their regulatory capital ratios when they are exposed to higher 
illiquidity.    
CE and wE		capture the impact of operating below the target capital ratio on the 
dependent variable in the absence of market liquidity shortage. We expect CE  and wE		to be 
positive and significant, when the dependent variable is the change in the total capital ratio, 
because banks operating below their target capital ratio, are expected to increase their capital 
ratio to get closer to their target. 
 12 
CN  captures the additional impact of market liquidity shortage on the dependent variable 
for banks more reliant on market liquidity compared to less reliant ones.  We expect it to be 
positive and significant, when the dependent variable is the change in the total capital ratio, 
because banks more reliant on market liquidity should more extensively increase their capital 
ratio than their less market-reliant peers. Similarly,  wN	gives the additional impact of market 
liquidity shortage on the dependent variable of banks operating below their target capital ratio 
compared to those operating above their target ratio. We also expect it to be positive and 
significant, when the dependent variable is the change in the total capital ratio, because banks 
below their target capital ratio will react more promptly and to a larger extent.  Consistently, 
we also expect (C0 + CN) and (w0 + wN) to be significantly positive.  
 
3. Results 
In this paper, we investigate the impact of market liquidity shortage on banks’ capital 
structure adjustment and the channels through which the total capital ratio is impacted. Since 
our investigation period is 2000-2014, our results may be influenced by the global financial 
crisis of 2007-2008 and government interventions7 during the crisis. Therefore, in addition to 
estimating our regressions on the whole investigation period, we also conduct estimations by 
excluding the crisis period. Tables 2 and 3 give the results on the whole investigation period 
and tables 4 and 5 give the results after excluding the crisis period. We use the fixed-effect 
method8 and cluster standard errors at the bank level.  
Overall, we find that market liquidity shortage does not impact the change in the total capital 
ratio of large banks, regardless of how much they rely on market liquidity or how far they are 
below their target capital ratio (C0,  w0, (C0 +	CN)	 and (w0 + wN) are not significant for large 
banks in ∆TCR equations). However, although C0 is significant at 10% during normal times 
for small banks in the ∆TCR equation and in the ∆RWA equation, the results show that small 
banks respond to market liquidity shortage by positively adjusting their total capital ratio. Such 
banks do so by decreasing the share of risk weighted assets in total assets, by reducing the share 
of loans in total assets and by downsizing their balance sheets. 
                                               
7 The U.S. Treasury made approximately $220 billion of capital injections through the Capital Purchase Program. 
The Federal Reserve implemented several facilities to provide significant amounts of liquidity to the banking 
system. These facilities include the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity 
Facility (AMLF), the commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF), the Money Market Investor Funding Facility 
(MMIFF), the Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF) and the Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF). 
8 We perform Hausman tests which validate the use of fixed effects versus random effects. 
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Furthermore, the impact on the total capital ratio is stronger for small banks that are more reliant 
on market liquidity ((C0 +	CN) > C0	) in the ∆TCR equation). They also reduce the share of 
risk weighted assets in total assets by a larger extent and cut loans more extensively than small 
banks which are less reliant on market liquidity ((C0 +	CN) < C0	) in ∆LOANS equation and 
∆RWA equation).  Similarly, small banks operating below their target total capital ratio increase 
their total capital ratio more significantly than their peers operating above their target ratio 
((w0 + wN) > 	w0 in ∆TCR equation). They also tend to reduce their risk weighted assets (and 
hence their loans) to a larger extent than small banks operating above their target total capital 
ratio ((w0 + wN) < 	w0) in ∆LOANS equation and ∆RWA equation). 
We also find that market liquidity shortages do not negatively impact the dividend to total assets 
ratio of small banks. Hence, banks do not seem to rely on retained earnings to increase their 
capital ratio9.   
Our results are also economically meaningful. For small banks less reliant on market liquidity, 
a one-standard deviation increase in MLS increases ∆TCR by 0.263 which takes the mean from 
-0.150 to +0.113. A one-standard deviation increase in MLS also takes the mean of ∆LOAN 
from +0.11 to -0.346 and the mean of ∆RWA from +0.09 to -0.332. These changes are more 
important for banks more reliant on market liquidity. A one-standard deviation increase in MLS 
leads to a variation of the mean of ∆TCR from -0.150 to +0.286, to a variation of the mean of 
∆LOAN from +0.11 to -0.58 and to a variation of the mean of ∆RWA from +0.09 to -0.622. 
For small banks operating above their target capital ratio, a one-standard deviation increase in 
MLS increases ∆TCR by +0.321 and this change is more important for banks operating below 
their target capital ratio (+0.471). A one-standard deviation increase in MLS leads, for banks 
operating above their target capital ratio, to a mean of ∆LOAN and ∆RWA equal to -0.435 and 
-0.418 respectively. These changes are also larger for banks operating below their target capital 
ratio (-0.597 and -0.713 for ∆LOAN and ∆RWA respectively). 
On the whole, these results show that only small banks react to liquidity squeeze by adjusting 
their balance sheets and by downsizing and cutting lending10 which enhances their total capital 
ratio. Nevertheless, this capital ratio improvement is stronger for small banks more reliant on 
market liquidity and small banks operating below their target capital ratio. Small banks may be 
adjusting their capital ratio positively because their confidence in the market decreases and/or 
                                               
9 A deeper investigation shows that small banks make cuts to their dividend payments during sharper episodes of 
liquidity squeeze as highlighted in the next section.  
10 This result is in line with the literature that underlines the negative effect of liquidity shocks on bank lending 
(Dombret et al. (2018), Chouchène et al. (2017), Allen et al. (2014), Calem et al. (2013), De Haas and Van Horen 
(2013), Schnabl (2012), Puri et al. (2011), Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010), Peek and Rosengren (1997)). 
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they need to show stronger financial strength or hedge against possible losses (Ramos, 1996). 
They might also behave as such for precautionary reasons to avoid falling under the minimum 
regulatory level of the capital ratio. By reducing their default risk (higher capital ratio), banks 
could also be aiming to avoid a higher cost of uninsured deposits by limiting the higher premium 
required by depositors (Fonseca and González, 2009) or the likelihood of a bank run (Dermine, 
2015). Most strikingly, small banks are the only ones to behave as such. Large banks' capital 
ratios and balance sheets more generally do not at all react to liquidity shortages possibly 
because they have easier access to fed funds under any circumstances and because their "too-
big-to-fail" status enables them to benefit from government support which is not the case for 
small banks. 
 
[insert tables 2,3, 4 & table 5] 
 
4. Further issues 
4.1.Severe market liquidity shortage  
In the main regressions, to capture market liquidity shortages, we use a dummy variable 
equal to one if the TED spread is higher than its 75th percentile. Now, instead of the 75th 
percentile we consider more restrictive conditions to capture severe cases of liquidity shortage 
on the market: 90th percentile and the mean plus two times the standard deviation. The results 
are presented in appendix B, tables 1B, 2B, 3B and 4B. They are consistent with our main 
results. Although we are considering sharper episodes of liquidity squeeze the capital ratios of 
large banks are still not impacted and the results for small banks are similar to the ones we had 
before. Interestingly such more severe episodes make small but not large banks reduce their 
dividend payments which further contributes to improve their capital ratios. As to large banks, 
their lending activities are negatively impacted and their size also diminishes (decrease in total 
assets). However, such impacts are not strong enough to affect their capital ratios.  
 
4.2.Do banks respond to market liquidity shortage by increasing their liquidity ratio? 
We document in this paper that small banks improve their capital ratio by downsizing, 
cutting lending, reducing their risk weighted assets and by decreasing their dividend payouts. 
However, another plausible channel to improve capital ratios could be the increase in liquidity 
ratios. Banks could indeed react to market liquidity shortage by increasing their liquidity which 
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could in turn "mechanically" increase their capital ratio. We hence investigate such possible 
behavior.  
Tables 5B and 6B show the results of the regressions with the change in the ratio of liquid 
assets to total assets as the dependent variable. The results show that market liquidity shortage 
does not affect large banks' liquidity ratios. In addition, although the interaction term is 
significant for small banks, the Wald test p values show that (C0 + CN) and (w0 + wN) are not 
significant and the null hypothesis cannot be rejected for C0 and w0. Thus, as for large banks, 
market liquidity shortage does not impact the change in the ratio of liquid assets to total assets 
of small banks regardless of their degree of reliance on market liquidity and whether they are 
above or below their target capital ratio. Therefore, the improvement in capital for small banks 
is not achieved via an increase in their holdings of liquid assets.  
 
4.3.Small banks' adjustment speed during market liquidity shortage episodes 
Our results show that market liquidity shortage leads small banks to positively adjust their 
total capital ratio. In this sub-section, we investigate the speed with which such banks adjust 
their total capital ratio during a period of market liquidity shortage. We express the adjustment 
speed as follows (e.g. Öztekin and Flannery, 2012; DeYoung et al., 2018): 
 
l&,$ = LR&,$/0 (9) 
 
Where l&,$ is the bank-specific, time-varying adjustment speed toward the target capital ratio; 
R&,$/0 is a vector of bank and time period characteristics that affect the speed of adjustment and 
L is a vector of coefficients to be estimated. Substituting equation (9) into (2) yields the 
following equation: 
D()*&,$ = LR&,$/01()*&,$∗ − ()*&,$/03 + e&,$ (10) 
 
Rewriting equation (10) and using equation (4) yields: 
D()*&,$ = LR&,$/0;<=&,$/0 + e&,$ (11) 
 
We account for bank fixed effects and quarterly time fixed effects and we estimate equation 
(11) using ordinary least squares11.  
                                               
11 we follow Öztekin and Flannery (2012) and DeYoung et al. (2018). 
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The results (see appendix B, table 7B) show that during times of market liquidity shortage, 
small banks more reliant on market liquidity adjust faster than small less reliant banks. Small 
banks operating below their target total capital ratio also adjust faster than small banks 
operating above their target total capital ratio. We find that the speed of adjustment of small 
banks more reliant on market liquidity is 0.0675% faster than the speed of adjustment of small 
banks less reliant on market liquidity and the adjustment speed of banks operating below their 
target capital ratio is 0.126% faster than at banks operating above their target capital ratio.  
 
5. Robustness checks 
We perform several robustness checks. First, in our baseline regression, we consider a bank 
to be relatively less liquid if its NSFR is lower than 100%. However, because the NSFR was 
introduced in the Basel III accords in 2010 and because banks were supposed to gradually come 
into compliance with these requirements from 2015 to 2019, we take a lower threshold because 
banks might not have considered falling below 100% as a threat.  We assume that less liquid 
banks are the ones whose NSFR is lower than the 10th percentile of NSFR (27.92%). The 
obtained results are consistent with those of the baseline regression (see appendix C).  
In addition, we use alternative variables to NSFR to measure banks’ liquidity level. These 
alternative variables are i/ reliance on wholesale funding, ii/ total liquid assets to total assets 
ratio and iii/ loans to core deposits ratio12 (see APPENDIX D). The obtained results are in line 
with our main results. 
We also limit our sample to banks that are strongly focused on intermediation activities that 
we name “real commercial banks” by only including banks with total deposits to total assets 
ratio and total loans over total assets higher than 30%. These banks are more exposed to 
liquidity risk since liquidity risk mostly emanates from exposures linked to intermediation 
activities (undrawn loan commitments, demand deposits, withdrawal of funds from wholesale 
deposits…). Considering this restricted sample of “real commercial banks”, our findings remain 
unchanged (see APPENDIX E).  
Moreover, in our baseline regressions we have included the crisis period by conducting 
estimations using the 75th percentile of the TED spread throughout the whole sample period. 
Instead, we construct our proxy of market liquidity shortage by using the 75th percentile of TED 
spread throughout normal times only. We also use the 90th percentile and the mean plus two 
                                               
12 See tables 1 for variables definitions.  
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times the standard deviation. The results obtained are consistent with our main results (see 
APPENDIX F). 
Our results indicate that large banks do not adjust their total capital ratio during periods of 
high pressure on the liquidity market. Therefore, we look deeper and investigate whether their 
behavior can be explained by differences in risk management sophistication.  Large banks with 
sophisticated risk management tools may not increase their total capital ratio because they can 
more easily cope with such shortage episodes while those with poorer risk management tools 
might positively react. As a proxy of risk management sophistication, we use the notional value 
of the interest rate swap and futures contracts committing the reporting institution to purchase 
or sell equity securities. We consider that banks above the median of these variables have better 
risk management practices (median equals 0). APPENDIX G displays the results of our 
estimations. We find similar results for all type of large banks. Large banks with a better risk 
management technology do not behave differently than their less sophisticated peers.  
In addition, we check if our results are robust to various definitions of the capital ratio. 
Instead of the total capital ratio we use the Tier 1 capital ratio. Tier 1 capital represents a bank's 
core capital. The obtained results are consistent with our main results (see APPENDIX H). In 
addition, we estimate the target Tier 1 capital ratio (TIER_ONE&,$
∗ ) for each bank i at time t. We 
use the estimated target Tier 1 capital ratio to compute the deviation as: 
;<=_(YZ*&,$/0 = (YZ*_[\Z&,$
∗ −	(YZ*_[\Z&,$/0 (12) 
We then isolate banks operating below their target Tier 1 capital ratio and perform estimations 
to check if our results found for banks operating below (above) their target total capital ratio 
are robust. Again, our main findings remain unchanged.  
Finally, instead of the TED spread, we use the commercial paper spread to proxy market 
liquidity shortage. Our results remain unchanged (see APPENDIX I). 
 
6. Conclusion 
Using an unbalanced panel database of U.S. commercial banks, we investigate the influence 
of episodes of liquidity squeeze on the market on their capital ratios and balance sheet 
adjustments. We specifically focus on the different channels that affect their total capital ratio. 
We also account for size, reliance on market liquidity and gap between banks' actual and target 
capital ratios.  Overall, our findings highlight that only small banks react to market liquidity 
shortage by increasing their total capital ratio. To improve their capital ratio, small banks 
downsize, decrease their dividend payouts, cut lending and reduce their share of risk weighted 
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assets in total assets. This improvement in the capital ratio is stronger at small banks more 
reliant on market liquidity and small banks operating below their target capital ratio. 
In addition to liquidity requirements, reducing leverage and holding higher capital ratios by 
substituting less risky assets for riskier ones is one of the multiple ways to hedge against a 
liquidity squeeze. Thus, liquidity requirements might be redundant for small banks because 
they take action to improve their solvency standards, but necessary for large banks. 
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Table 1: Definition of variables and descriptive statistics 
 
Variables definitions Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent variables       
tcr (%) total capital ratio 438,608 18.05 10.20 9.84 67.25 
Δtcr quarterly change in total capital ratio 428,507 -0.15 2.24 -57.41 57.41 
rwa (%) risk weighted assets as a percent of total assets 434,251 67.71 13.97 26 98.67 
Δrwa quarterly change in risk weighted assets to total assets ratio 424,181 0.09 4.01 -72.67 72.67 
loan_a (%) total loans to total assets ratio 434,257 62.49 16.17 19.30 88.14 
Δloan quarterly change in total loans to total assets ratio 424,224 0.11 3.83 -68.84 68.84 
Δasset (%) quarterly change in total assets divided by total assets 428,546 1.85 5.42 -11.88 26.13 
dividend (%) dividend to total assets ratio 265,268 0.25 0.62 0 3.44 
Tier one (%) Tier one capital ratio 438,410 16.79 10.06 7.95 64.68 
Δtier  quarterly change in Tier 1 ratio 428,309 -0.15 2.18 -56.40 56.73 
       
Market liquidity shortages proxies       
TED spread (%) the difference between the three-month London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) and the three-month 
Treasury bills rate 
438,608 0.47 0.42 0.15 2.45 
MLS_ted dummy equal to one if the TED spread is higher than its 75th percentile or zero otherwise** 438,608 0.25 0.43 0 1 
commercial paper spread (%) the spread between the three-month commercial paper rate for highly rated (AA) non-financial 
borrowers and the three-month Treasury bills rate. 
438,608 0.33 0.39 0.07 2.28 
MLS_cp dummy equal to one if the commercial paper spread is higher than its 75th percentile or zero 
otherwise** 
438,608 0.27 0.44 0 1 
       
Extent on market liquidity proxies       
NSFR (%) Net Stable Funding Ratio (see Appendix K) 277,247 84.39 50.07 9.16 224.59 
Z_nsfr dummy equal to one if the NSFR<100% or zero otherwise** 277,247 0.63 0.48 0 1 
rwf (%) reliance on wholesale funding, it depicts the portion of a bank’s total funds that are from wholesale 
sources. (total borrowings + brokered deposits) / (total borrowings + total deposits). 
431,331 8.23 10 0 40.62 
Z_rwf dummy equal to one if rwf is higher than its 75th percentile or zero otherwise 431,331 0.25 0.43 0 1 
LTCD (%) loans to core deposits ratio 429,942 78.44 32.42 7.03 238.75 
Z_LTCD dummy equal to one if LTCD> 100% or zero otherwise 429,942 0.16 0.37 0 1 
liquid_a (%) assets that can quickly be turned into cash without an important loss as a percentage of total assets. 
liquid assets are calculated as the sum of cash and balances due, federal funds sold and securities 
438,599 24.32 15.69 2.81 81.47 
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purchased under agreements to resell, total securities, and total trading account assets less the value 
of total pledged securities 
Z_liq dummy equal to one if liquid_a is lower than its 25th percentile or zero otherwise 438,599 0.25 0.43 0 1 
       
Variables for bank’s capital position       
tcr* (%) The estimated target total capital ratio 267,039 13.93 1.48 8.73 18.09 
dummy_gap dummy equal to one if the bank is operating below its target capital ratio 267,039 0.43 0.49 0 1 
Tier 1* (%) The estimated target Tier 1 capital ratio 267,039 13.10 1.43 7.96 17.03 
dummy_gap_one dummy equal to one if the bank is operating below its target Tier one capital ratio 267,039 0.46 0.50 0 1 
       
Control variables       
size the natural logarithm of total assets 438,608 18.72 1.37 11.13 28.36 
ROA (%) return on assets 430,748 0.83 1.40 -6.75 5.02 
NPL (%) non-performing loans over total loans 425,972 1.58 2.51 0 14.36 
GDP growth (%) quarterly growth rate of GDP 438,608 0.97 0.73 -1.97 2.47 
M&A dummy for mergers and acquisitions. Dummy equal to one if the asset growth rate is lower than 10% 
during the quarter and zero otherwise. 428,546 0.93 0.26 0 1 
       
Other variables       
depo_a (%) total deposits to total assets ratio 434,208 81.93 12.37 2.21 92.98 
nvswp the notional value of interest rate swap (in thousands of USD) 277,249 8423916 4.97E+08 0 5.45E+10 
eqfu futures contracts committing the reporting institution to purchase or to sell equity securities or 
instruments based on equity indexes such as the standard and poor's 500, or the nikkei (in thousands 
of USD) 
277,249 6262.70 468267 0 8.24E+07 
**in robustness checks, we use alternative thresholds. 
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TABLE 2: Impact of market liquidity shortages according to bank liquidity level  
This table displays the impact of market liquidity shortages on the change in total capital ratio (∆TCR), on the change in asset part of risk weighted assets (∆RWA), on the change in asset part of total loans (∆LOAN), 
on the change in total assets (∆ASSET) and on dividend to total assets ratio (DIVIDEND) according to whether or not the bank is more reliant on market liquidity.  MLSt-1 is a dummy variable that is equal to one if 
the TED spread is higher than its 75th percentile at time t-1. Z!,t-1  is a dummy variable that is equal to one if bank i is more reliant on market liquidity (NSFR<100%) at time t-1 or 0 otherwise. size is the natural 
logarithm of total assets. ROA is return on asset. NPL is non-performing loans over total loans. Dummy_gap is a dummy variable equals to one if the bank is operating below its target total capital ratio (!"#$,&'( > 0) 
or 0 otherwise. GDP growth is the quarterly growth rate of GDP. M&A is a dummy variable for mergers and acquisitions. It is equal to one if the asset growth rate is lower than 10% during the quarter and zero 
otherwise. “large” corresponds to banks with total assets higher than $1 billion and “small” corresponds to banks with total assets lower or equal to $1 billion. Standard errors are in parentheses. *indicate statistical 
significance at the 10% level. **indicate statistical significance at the 5% level. ***indicate statistical significance at the 1% level. 
 ∆TCR ∆RWA ∆LOAN ∆ASSET DIVIDEND 
 LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL 
+,-&'( (/() -0.578 0.263*** 1.501* -0.422*** -0.159 -0.456*** 0.187 -0.430** 0.0575 0.0513
** 
 (0.580) (0.0973) (0.793) (0.157) (0.818) (0.152) (0.683) (0.172) (0.0570) (0.0259) 
1$,&'( (/2) 0.103 0.0685*** -0.137 -0.142*** -0.530** -0.270*** 0.0816 0.0198 -0.00106 0.00587 
 (0.166) (0.0137) (0.212) (0.0238) (0.259) (0.0244) (0.206) (0.0255) (0.0210) (0.00456) 
34556_89:$,&'( (/;) 0.597*** 0.414*** -0.860*** -0.931*** -0.380** -0.475*** 0.456*** 0.193*** -0.0502
*** -0.0144*** 
 (0.0965) (0.0154) (0.128) (0.0308) (0.168) (0.0276) (0.139) (0.0290) (0.0127) (0.00448) 
1$,&'( ∗ +,-&'( (/=) 0.191 0.173*** -0.495 -0.290*** -0.0516 -0.234*** -0.142 0.0345 0.0110 -0.00767 
 (0.155) (0.0244) (0.364) (0.0427) (0.393) (0.0397) (0.344) (0.0394) (0.0340) (0.00666) 
Size	$,&'(  0.105 1.066*** 0.286 -0.961*** -0.412 -1.324*** -2.360*** -2.310*** 0.0164 -0.0945
*** 
 (0.273) (0.0552) (0.370) (0.0675) (0.325) (0.0760) (0.247) (0.0853) (0.0175) (0.0120) 
ROA	$,&'(  0.221*** 0.379*** -0.0235 -0.204*** -0.137** -0.326*** 0.273*** 0.184*** 0.0111
** 0.00441** 
 (0.0360) (0.0115) (0.0464) (0.0166) (0.0533) (0.0172) (0.0490) (0.0137) (0.00459) (0.00185) 
NPL	$,&'(  0.0532** 0.0924*** -0.102*** -0.144*** -0.138*** -0.196*** -0.243*** -0.296*** -0.00259 0.000494 
 (0.0213) (0.00384) (0.0264) (0.00611) (0.0330) (0.00660) (0.0394) (0.00745) (0.00554) (0.000958) 
GDP	growth	&'(  0.267 0.137** 0.0269 0.459*** 0.0829 0.506*** -1.174*** -0.809*** -0.0395
** -0.0990*** 
 (0.307) (0.0544) (0.297) (0.0933) (0.372) (0.0915) (0.270) (0.0989) (0.0192) (0.0112) 
+&"$,&'(  0.904*** 1.407*** 3.036*** 3.245*** 2.175*** 3.611*** -15.36*** -13.11*** 0.0183 0.0179
*** 
 (0.111) (0.0392) (0.210) (0.0676) (0.245) (0.0777) (0.267) (0.0805) (0.0160) (0.00658) 
Banks fixed effect  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
time fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
/( + /=  -0.387 0.435 1.006 -0.711 -0.211 -0.690 0.0457 -0.396 0.0685 0.0437 
Wald test p value 0.493 0.000 0.147 0.000 0.766 0.000 0.939 0.021 0.0918 0.0846 
r2 0.0770 0.210 0.116 0.0895 0.0760 0.130 0.625 0.542 0.415 0.525 
N 17408 249459 17181 248520 17181 248527 17408 249459 17082 237443 
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TABLE 3: Impact of market liquidity shortages according to gap between actual and target capital 
This table displays the impact of market liquidity shortages on the change in total capital ratio (∆TCR), on the change in asset part of risk weighted assets (∆RWA), on the change in asset part of total loans (∆LOAN), 
on the change in total assets (∆ASSET) and on dividend to total assets ratio (DIVIDEND) according to whether or not the bank is operating below its target total capital ratio.  MLSt-1 is a dummy variable that is equal 
to one if the TED spread is higher than its 75th percentile at time t-1. Z!,t-1  is a dummy variable that is equal to one if bank i is more reliant on market liquidity (NSFR<100%) at time t-1 or 0 otherwise. size is the 
natural logarithm of total assets. ROA is return on asset. NPL is non-performing loans over total loans. Dummy_gap is a dummy variable equals to one if the bank is operating below its target total capital ratio 
(!"#$,&'( > 0) or 0 otherwise. GDP growth is the quarterly growth rate of GDP. M&A is a dummy variable for mergers and acquisitions. It is equal to one if the asset growth rate is lower than 10% during the quarter 
and zero otherwise. “large” corresponds to banks with total assets higher than $1 billion and “small” corresponds to banks with total assets lower or equal to $1 billion. Standard errors are in parentheses. *indicate 
statistical significance at the 10% level. **indicate statistical significance at the 5% level. ***indicate statistical significance at the 1% level. 
 ∆TCR ∆RWA ∆LOAN ∆ASSET DIVIDEND 
 LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL 
+,-&'( (w() -0.630 0.321*** 1.206* -0.508*** -0.160 -0.545*** 0.0189 -0.414** 0.0689 0.0486
* 
 (0.569) (0.0962) (0.676) (0.155) (0.710) (0.150) (0.633) (0.171) (0.0466) (0.0257) 
1$,&'( (w2) 0.140 0.111*** -0.237 -0.214*** -0.541** -0.328*** 0.0524 0.0284 0.00108 0.00426 
 (0.156) (0.0129) (0.204) (0.0226) (0.242) (0.0233) (0.185) (0.0237) (0.0195) (0.00423) 
34556_89:$,&'( (w;) 0.532*** 0.378*** -0.819*** -0.861*** -0.366** -0.436*** 0.443*** 0.191*** -0.0497
*** -0.0134*** 
 (0.107) (0.0162) (0.145) (0.0317) (0.169) (0.0288) (0.146) (0.0303) (0.0142) (0.00474) 
34556_89:$,&'( ∗ +,-&'( (w=) 0.289* 0.150*** -0.190 -0.295*** -0.0588 -0.162*** 0.0552 0.00937 -0.00208 -0.00455 
 (0.159) (0.0179) (0.260) (0.0368) (0.278) (0.0339) (0.245) (0.0381) (0.0252) (0.00571) 
Size	$,&'(  0.106 1.067*** 0.288 -0.962*** -0.412 -1.328*** -2.359*** -2.309*** 0.0163 -0.0946
*** 
 (0.275) (0.0552) (0.371) (0.0675) (0.326) (0.0760) (0.247) (0.0854) (0.0175) (0.0121) 
ROA	$,&'(  0.221*** 0.379*** -0.0225 -0.204*** -0.137** -0.326*** 0.274*** 0.184*** 0.0111
** 0.00442** 
 (0.0358) (0.0115) (0.0464) (0.0166) (0.0533) (0.0172) (0.0490) (0.0137) (0.00459) (0.00185) 
NPL	$,&'(  0.0525** 0.0917*** -0.102*** -0.143*** -0.138*** -0.195*** -0.243*** -0.296*** -0.00259 0.000526 
 (0.0214) (0.00383) (0.0265) (0.00607) (0.0331) (0.00659) (0.0395) (0.00745) (0.00553) (0.000959) 
GDP	growth	&'(  0.267 0.137** 0.0272 0.458*** 0.0828 0.506*** -1.173*** -0.809*** -0.0396
** -0.0990*** 
 (0.307) (0.0544) (0.296) (0.0933) (0.372) (0.0915) (0.270) (0.0989) (0.0192) (0.0112) 
+&"$,&'(  0.904*** 1.407*** 3.034*** 3.245*** 2.175*** 3.611*** -15.36*** -13.11*** 0.0184 0.0178
*** 
 (0.111) (0.0391) (0.210) (0.0676) (0.245) (0.0777) (0.267) (0.0805) (0.0419) (0.0115) 
Banks fixed effect  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
time fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
w( + w=  -0.341 0.471 1.017 -0.803 -0.219 -0.707 0.0740 -0.404 0.0668 0.0440 
Wald test p value 0.549 0.000 0.154 0.000 0.763 0.000 0.902 0.019 0.107 0.0802 
r2 0.0774 0.210 0.116 0.0895 0.0760 0.130 0.625 0.542 0.415 0.525 
N 17408 249459 17181 248520 17181 248527 17408 249459 17082 237443 
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TABLE 4: Impact of market liquidity shortages according to bank liquidity level during non-crisis period 
This table displays during non-crisis period, the impact of market liquidity shortages on the change in total capital ratio (∆TCR), on the change in asset part of risk weighted assets (∆RWA), on the change in asset 
part of total loans (∆LOAN), on the change in total assets (∆ASSET) and on dividend to total assets ratio (DIVIDEND) according to whether or not the bank is more reliant on market liquidity.  We exclude the crisis 
period from our investigation period. MLSt-1 is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the TED spread is higher than its 75th percentile at time t-1 throughout the entire sample. Z!,t-1  is a dummy variable that is equal 
to one if bank i is more reliant on market liquidity (NSFR<100%) at time t-1 or 0 otherwise. size is the natural logarithm of total assets. ROA is return on asset. NPL is non-performing loans over total loans. 
Dummy_gap is a dummy variable equals to one if the bank is operating below its target total capital ratio (!"#$,&'( > 0) or 0 otherwise. GDP growth is the quarterly growth rate of GDP. M&A is a dummy variable 
for mergers and acquisitions. It is equal to one if the asset growth rate is lower than 10% during the quarter and zero otherwise. “large” corresponds to banks with total assets higher than $1 billion and “small” 
corresponds to banks with total assets lower or equal to $1 billion. Standard errors are in parentheses. *indicate statistical significance at the 10% level. **indicate statistical significance at the 5% level. ***indicate 
statistical significance at the 1% level. 
 ∆TCR ∆RWA ∆LOAN ∆ASSET DIVIDEND 
 LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL 
+,-&'( (/() -0.492 0.190
* 1.767* -0.282* 0.147 -0.325** 0.452 -0.424** 0.0906 0.0626** 
 (0.609) (0.0978) (0.918) (0.158) (0.953) (0.152) (0.771) (0.173) (0.0671) (0.0265) 
1$,&'( (/2) 0.0962 0.0692
*** -0.101 -0.157*** -0.492* -0.280*** 0.0893 0.0283 -0.00644 0.00314 
 (0.181) (0.0143) (0.222) (0.0249) (0.271) (0.0250) (0.207) (0.0267) (0.0196) (0.00473) 
34556_89:$,&'( (/;) 0.618
*** 0.443*** -0.945*** -0.995*** -0.401** -0.520*** 0.424*** 0.196*** -0.0539*** -0.0160*** 
 (0.107) (0.0166) (0.143) (0.0332) (0.185) (0.0291) (0.143) (0.0307) (0.0159) (0.00492) 
1$,&'( ∗ +,-&'( (/=) 0.0842 0.170
*** -0.832 -0.243*** -0.551 -0.206*** -0.309 0.0951* -0.0152 -0.0210** 
 (0.175) (0.0328) (0.532) (0.0591) (0.586) (0.0478) (0.462) (0.0505) (0.0509) (0.00930) 
Size	$,&'(  0.0689 0.965
*** 0.330 -0.737*** -0.500 -1.129*** -2.253*** -2.262*** 0.0291* -0.0892*** 
 (0.302) (0.0572) (0.425) (0.0673) (0.373) (0.0754) (0.265) (0.0878) (0.0172) (0.0129) 
ROA	$,&'(  0.256
*** 0.380*** -0.0646 -0.185*** -0.165** -0.309*** 0.297*** 0.204*** 0.0126** 0.00433** 
 (0.0488) (0.0134) (0.0657) (0.0187) (0.0754) (0.0197) (0.0620) (0.0154) (0.00598) (0.00211) 
NPL	$,&'(  0.0709
*** 0.0931*** -0.109*** -0.133*** -0.156*** -0.180*** -0.241*** -0.299*** -0.00347 0.000815 
 (0.0261) (0.00429) (0.0311) (0.00669) (0.0375) (0.00720) (0.0449) (0.00791) (0.00713) (0.00109) 
GDP	growth	&'(  0.260 0.137
** 0.0383 0.459*** 0.0907 0.507*** -1.177*** -0.812*** -0.0394** -0.0989*** 
 (0.307) (0.0545) (0.297) (0.0935) (0.373) (0.0917) (0.271) (0.0992) (0.0194) (0.0112) 
+&"$,&'(  0.993
*** 1.325*** 2.777*** 3.223*** 2.032*** 3.600*** -15.25*** -13.05*** 0.0182 0.0182*** 
 (0.125) (0.0412) (0.225) (0.0706) (0.266) (0.0804) (0.286) (0.0850) (0.0169) (0.00675) 
Banks fixed effect  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
time fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
/( + /=  -0.408 0.360 0.936 -0.525 -0.404 -0.531 0.143 -0.329 0.0754 0.0416 
Wald test p value 0.483 0.000 0.199 0.001 0.583 0.000 0.815 0.0578 0.0630 0.106 
r2 0.0818 0.200 0.115 0.0928 0.0756 0.134 0.629 0.537 0.429 0.534 
N 14841 215751 14674 214975 14674 214982 14841 215751 14538 203940 
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TABLE 5: Impact of market liquidity shortages according to gap between actual and target capital during non-crisis period 
This table displays during non-crisis period, the impact of market liquidity shortages on the change in total capital ratio (∆TCR), on the change in asset part of risk weighted assets (∆RWA), on the change in asset 
part of total loans (∆LOAN), on the change in total assets (∆ASSET) and on dividend to total assets ratio (DIVIDEND) according to whether or not the bank is operating below its target total capital ratio. We exclude 
the crisis period from our investigation period. MLSt-1 is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the TED spread is higher than its 75th percentile at time t-1 throughout the entire sample. Z!,t-1  is a dummy variable 
that is equal to one if bank i is more reliant on market liquidity (NSFR<100%) at time t-1 or 0 otherwise. size is the natural logarithm of total assets. ROA is return on asset. NPL is non-performing loans over total 
loans. Dummy_gap is a dummy variable equals to one if the bank is operating below its target total capital ratio (!"#$,&'( > 0) or 0 otherwise. GDP growth is the quarterly growth rate of GDP. M&A is a dummy 
variable for mergers and acquisitions. It is equal to one if the asset growth rate is lower than 10% during the quarter and zero otherwise. “large” corresponds to banks with total assets higher than $1 billion and “small” 
corresponds to banks with total assets lower or equal to $1 billion. Standard errors are in parentheses. *indicate statistical significance at the 10% level. **indicate statistical significance at the 5% level. ***indicate 
statistical significance at the 1% level. 
 ∆TCR ∆RWA ∆LOAN ∆ASSET DIVIDEND 
 LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL 
+,-&'( (w() -0.638 0.228
** 1.532** -0.330** -0.178 -0.400*** 0.298 -0.367** 0.147** 0.0534** 
 (0.564) (0.0962) (0.720) (0.155) (0.762) (0.150) (0.670) (0.171) (0.0637) (0.0260) 
1$,&'( (w2) 0.106 0.0943*** -0.196 -0.193*** -0.554** -0.310*** 0.0545 0.0425* -0.00787 0.00108 
 (0.176) (0.0139) (0.220) (0.0243) (0.258) (0.0241) (0.199) (0.0258) (0.0194) (0.00460) 
34556_89:$,&'( (w;) 0.584
*** 0.410*** -0.869*** -0.944*** -0.377** -0.499*** 0.442*** 0.200*** -0.0438*** -0.0156*** 
 (0.113) (0.0172) (0.155) (0.0335) (0.180) (0.0298) (0.148) (0.0315) (0.0161) (0.00504) 
34556_89:$,&'( ∗ +,-&'( (w=) 0.290 0.256
*** -0.659 -0.400*** -0.214 -0.162*** -0.157 -0.0347 -0.0934** -0.00536 
 (0.293) (0.0258) (0.470) (0.0561) (0.463) (0.0451) (0.340) (0.0507) (0.0425) (0.00802) 
Size	$,&'(  0.0720 0.970
*** 0.326 -0.745*** -0.499 -1.133*** -2.254*** -2.262*** 0.0283* -0.0894*** 
 (0.305) (0.0574) (0.427) (0.0673) (0.374) (0.0756) (0.266) (0.0878) (0.0171) (0.0129) 
ROA	$,&'(  0.256
*** 0.380*** -0.0638 -0.185*** -0.165** -0.309*** 0.298*** 0.204*** 0.0126** 0.00435** 
 (0.0488) (0.0134) (0.0655) (0.0187) (0.0753) (0.0197) (0.0620) (0.0154) (0.00599) (0.00211) 
NPL	$,&'(  0.0709
*** 0.0929*** -0.109*** -0.133*** -0.155*** -0.179*** -0.240*** -0.299*** -0.00338 0.000873 
 (0.0261) (0.00428) (0.0312) (0.00668) (0.0376) (0.00720) (0.0449) (0.00790) (0.00712) (0.00109) 
GDP	growth	&'(  0.260 0.138
** 0.0386 0.459*** 0.0911 0.506*** -1.177*** -0.812*** -0.0394** -0.0989*** 
 (0.307) (0.0545) (0.297) (0.0935) (0.372) (0.0917) (0.271) (0.0992) (0.0194) (0.0112) 
+&"$,&'(  0.994
*** 1.324*** 2.770*** 3.224*** 2.028*** 3.600*** -15.25*** -13.05*** 0.0179 0.0181*** 
 (0.125) (0.0411) (0.226) (0.0706) (0.266) (0.0804) (0.286) (0.0850) (0.0170) (0.00675) 
Banks fixed effect  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
time fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
w( + w=  -0.348 0.484 0.873 -0.730 -0.392 -0.562 0.141 -0.402 0.0536 0.0480 
Wald test p value 0.566 0.000 0.258 0.000 0.610 0.000 0.820 0.0235 0.149 0.0614 
r2 0.0820 0.200 0.115 0.0929 0.0755 0.134 0.629 0.537 0.430 0.534 
N 14841 215751 14674 214975 14674 214982 14841 215751 14538 203940 
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Graph 1: The evolution of TED spread and commercial paper spread from 2000 to 2014 (average quarterly data).  
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis website 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Graph 2: The evolution of TED spread and commercial paper spread from 2000 to 2014 (average quarterly data) while 
excluding the global financial crisis period (2007q3 to 2009q2). 
Source:  Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis website 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Estimation of target capital ratios 
 
This table displays the results of the estimation of equation (3) using fixed effect methodology and allowing computing the target 
capital ratios. MLS is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the TED spread is higher than its 75th percentile at time t-1 throughout 
the whole sample. NSFR is Net Stable Funding Ratio. size is the natural logarithm of total assets. ROA is return on assets, NPL is 
the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans. M&A is a dummy variable for mergers and acquisitions. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. *indicate statistical significance at the 10% level. **indicate statistical significance at the 5% level. ***indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%level. All independent variables are lagged one quarter. 
 TCR TIER ONE 
Lag dependent variable 0.826*** 0.831*** 
 (0.00380) (0.00369) 
NSFR 0.000615** 0.000583** 
 (0.000252) (0.000245) 
size 0.106*** 0.0956*** 
 (0.0313) (0.0306) 
ROA 0.122*** 0.117*** 
 (0.00951) (0.00922) 
NPL 0.0657*** 0.0599*** 
 (0.00465) (0.00456) 
GDP growth rate 0.0163*** 0.0213*** 
 (0.00577) (0.00566) 
!&#  0.225*** 0.224*** 
 (0.0241) (0.0237) 
MLS -0.130*** -0.129*** 
 (0.0105) (0.0103) 
constant 0.477 0.393 
  (0.598) (0.584) 
r2 0.825 0.831 
N 267039 267036 
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APPENDIX B: 
TABLE 1B: Impact of severe market liquidity shortages (90th percentile) according to bank liquidity level 
This table displays the impact of market liquidity shortages on the change in total capital ratio (∆TCR), on the change in asset part of risk weighted assets (∆RWA), on the change in asset part of total loans (∆LOAN), 
on the change in total assets (∆ASSET) and on dividend to total assets ratio (DIVIDEND) according to whether or not the bank is more reliant on market liquidity.  MLSt-1 is a dummy variable that is equal to one if 
the TED spread is higher than its 90th percentile at time t-1. Z!,t-1  is a dummy variable that is equal to one if bank i is more reliant on market liquidity (NSFR<100%) at time t-1 or 0 otherwise. size is the natural 
logarithm of total assets. ROA is return on asset. NPL is non-performing loans over total loans. Dummy_gap is a dummy variable equals to one if the bank is operating below its target total capital ratio or 0 otherwise. 
GDP growth is the quarterly growth rate of GDP. M&A is a dummy variable for mergers and acquisitions. It is equal to one if the asset growth rate is lower than 10% during the quarter and zero otherwise. “large” 
corresponds to banks with total assets higher than $1 billion and “small” corresponds to banks with total assets lower or equal to $1 billion. Standard errors are in parentheses. *indicate statistical significance at the 
10% level. **indicate statistical significance at the 5% level. ***indicate statistical significance at the 1% level. 
 ∆TCR ∆RWA ∆LOAN ∆ASSET DIVIDEND 
 LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL 
!"#$%& ((&) 0.150 0.984*** 0.404 -0.636*** -1.892** -1.109*** -3.720*** -2.065*** -0.0839 -0.247
*** 
 (0.600) (0.0970) (0.777) (0.165) (0.783) (0.166) (0.690) (0.170) (0.0770) (0.0270) 
*+,$%& ((-) 0.120 0.0973*** -0.237 -0.190*** -0.585** -0.310*** 0.0419 0.0353 -0.00270 0.00485 
 (0.157) (0.0133) (0.209) (0.0231) (0.243) (0.0234) (0.192) (0.0243) (0.0203) (0.00435) 
./001_345+,$%& ((6) 0.598*** 0.414*** -0.862*** -0.931*** -0.379** -0.475*** 0.455*** 0.193*** -0.0502*** -0.0144*** 
 (0.0965) (0.0154) (0.129) (0.0308) (0.168) (0.0276) (0.139) (0.0290) (0.0127) (0.00448) 
*+,$%& ∗ !"#$%& ((8) 0.313 0.156*** -0.00848 -0.268*** 0.620 -0.203*** 0.150 -0.0760 0.0512 -0.00620 
 (0.281) (0.0383) (0.401) (0.0647) (0.426) (0.0691) (0.406) (0.0599) (0.0502) (0.00911) 
Size	+,$%&  0.103 1.068*** 0.289 -0.965*** -0.412 -1.328*** -2.359*** -2.307*** 0.0163 -0.0946*** 
 (0.274) (0.0553) (0.370) (0.0677) (0.325) (0.0761) (0.247) (0.0853) (0.0175) (0.0120) 
ROA	+,$%&  0.221*** 0.379*** -0.0228 -0.204*** -0.136** -0.325*** 0.274*** 0.184*** 0.0111
** 0.00443** 
 (0.0359) (0.0115) (0.0466) (0.0166) (0.0533) (0.0172) (0.0490) (0.0137) (0.00460) (0.00185) 
NPL	+,$%&  0.0531** 0.0917*** -0.102*** -0.142*** -0.138*** -0.195*** -0.243*** -0.296*** -0.00258 0.000519 
 (0.0214) (0.00384) (0.0265) (0.00610) (0.0330) (0.00660) (0.0394) (0.00745) (0.00554) (0.000959) 
GDP	growth	$%&  0.0545 0.320*** 0.577** 0.161*** -0.0251 0.206*** -1.142*** -1.020*** -0.00483 -0.0745
*** 
 (0.201) (0.0328) (0.270) (0.0509) (0.253) (0.0514) (0.223) (0.0539) (0.0208) (0.0107) 
!&M+,$%&  0.906*** 1.408*** 3.033*** 3.244*** 2.175*** 3.610*** -15.36*** -13.11*** 0.0184 0.0178
*** 
 (0.111) (0.0392) (0.210) (0.0676) (0.245) (0.0777) (0.267) (0.0805) (0.0160) (0.00658) 
Banks fixed effect  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
time fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
(& + (8  0.463 1.141 0.396 -0.904 -1.272 -1.312 -3.570 -2.141 -0.0327 -0.253 
Wald test p value 0.361 0.000 0.552 0.000 0.0484 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.546 0.000 
r2 0.0770 0.210 0.115 0.0894 0.0762 0.130 0.625 0.542 0.415 0.525 
N 17408 249459 17181 248520 17181 248527 17408 249459 17082 237443 
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TABLE 2B: Impact of severe market liquidity shortages (90th percentile) according to gap between actual and target capital 
This table displays the impact of market liquidity shortages on the change in total capital ratio (∆TCR), on the change in asset part of risk weighted assets (∆RWA), on the change in asset part of total loans (∆LOAN), 
on the change in total assets (∆ASSET) and on dividend to total assets ratio (DIVIDEND) according to whether or not the bank is operating below its target total capital ratio.  MLSt-1 is a dummy variable that is equal 
to one if the TED spread is higher than its 90th percentile at time t-1. Z!,t-1  is a dummy variable that is equal to one if bank i is more reliant on market liquidity (NSFR<100%) at time t-1 or 0 otherwise. size is the 
natural logarithm of total assets. ROA is return on asset. NPL is non-performing loans over total loans. Dummy_gap is a dummy variable equals to one if the bank is operating below its target total capital ratio or 0 
otherwise. GDP growth is the quarterly growth rate of GDP. M&A is a dummy variable for mergers and acquisitions. It is equal to one if the asset growth rate is lower than 10% during the quarter and zero otherwise. 
“large” corresponds to banks with total assets higher than $1 billion and “small” corresponds to banks with total assets lower or equal to $1 billion. Standard errors are in parentheses. *indicate statistical significance 
at the 10% level. **indicate statistical significance at the 5% level. ***indicate statistical significance at the 1% level. 
 ∆TCR ∆RWA ∆LOAN ∆ASSET DIVIDEND 
 LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL 
!"#$%& (w&) 0.140 1.093*** 0.463 -0.800*** -1.210 -1.243*** -4.022*** -2.138*** -0.0900 -0.248
*** 
 (0.559) (0.0917) (0.700) (0.159) (0.741) (0.158) (0.644) (0.166) (0.0640) (0.0263) 
*+,$%& (w-) 0.140 0.111*** -0.237 -0.214*** -0.540** -0.328*** 0.0498 0.0284 0.000655 0.00427 
 (0.156) (0.0129) (0.204) (0.0226) (0.242) (0.0233) (0.185) (0.0237) (0.0196) (0.00423) 
./001_345+,$%& (w6) 0.563*** 0.410*** -0.854*** -0.920*** -0.371** -0.468*** 0.406*** 0.190*** -0.0564
*** -0.0133*** 
 (0.0992) (0.0156) (0.131) (0.0313) (0.171) (0.0281) (0.141) (0.0294) (0.0138) (0.00458) 
./001_345+,$%& ∗ !"#$%& (w8) 0.394* 0.0334 -0.0841 -0.109** -0.0997 -0.0607 0.561 0.0328 0.0703 -0.0111 
 (0.204) (0.0262) (0.316) (0.0504) (0.418) (0.0516) (0.341) (0.0568) (0.0441) (0.00730) 
Size	+,$%&  0.101 1.071*** 0.290 -0.968*** -0.411 -1.331*** -2.363*** -2.310*** 0.0159 -0.0944
*** 
 (0.275) (0.0555) (0.370) (0.0679) (0.325) (0.0763) (0.248) (0.0857) (0.0175) (0.0121) 
ROA	+,$%&  0.220*** 0.378*** -0.0226 -0.203*** -0.137** -0.325*** 0.273*** 0.184*** 0.0110
** 0.00441** 
 (0.0358) (0.0115) (0.0466) (0.0166) (0.0533) (0.0172) (0.0491) (0.0137) (0.00455) (0.00185) 
NPL	+,$%&  0.0524** 0.0914*** -0.102*** -0.142*** -0.138*** -0.194*** -0.244*** -0.296*** -0.00271 0.000523 
 (0.0213) (0.00384) (0.0264) (0.00609) (0.0330) (0.00660) (0.0395) (0.00745) (0.00553) (0.000959) 
GDP	growth	$%&  0.0532 0.322*** 0.578** 0.159*** -0.0228 0.204*** -1.145*** -1.023*** -0.00507 -0.0743
*** 
 (0.202) (0.0329) (0.270) (0.0510) (0.253) (0.0515) (0.223) (0.0541) (0.0208) (0.0107) 
!&M+,$%&  0.906*** 1.408*** 3.033*** 3.243*** 2.174*** 3.610*** -15.36*** -13.11*** 0.0185 0.0179*** 
 (0.111) (0.0392) (0.210) (0.0676) (0.245) (0.0777) (0.267) (0.0805) (0.0160) (0.00657) 
Banks fixed effect  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
time fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
w& + w8  0.534 1.126 0.379 -0.910 -1.310 -1.303 -3.461 -2.105 -0.0198 -0.259 
Wald test p value 0.290 0.000 0.573 0.000 0.0426 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.720 0.000 
r2 0.0773 0.209 0.115 0.0893 0.0760 0.130 0.625 0.542 0.416 0.525 
N 17408 249459 17181 248520 17181 248527 17408 249459 17082 237443 
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TABLE 3B: Impact of severe market liquidity shortages (mean plus two times standard deviation) according to bank liquidity level 
This table displays the impact of market liquidity shortages on the change in total capital ratio (∆TCR), on the change in asset part of risk weighted assets (∆RWA), on the change in asset part of total loans (∆LOAN), 
on the change in total assets (∆ASSET) and on dividend to total assets ratio (DIVIDEND) according to whether or not the bank is more reliant on market liquidity.  MLSt-1 is a dummy variable that is equal to one if 
the TED spread is higher at time t-1, than its mean plus two times its standard deviation. Z!,t-1  is a dummy variable that is equal to one if bank i is more reliant on market liquidity (NSFR<100%) at time t-1 or 0 
otherwise. size is the natural logarithm of total assets. ROA is return on asset. NPL is non-performing loans over total loans. Dummy_gap is a dummy variable equals to one if the bank is operating below its target 
total capital ratio or 0 otherwise. GDP growth is the quarterly growth rate of GDP. M&A is a dummy variable for mergers and acquisitions. It is equal to one if the asset growth rate is lower than 10% during the 
quarter and zero otherwise. “large” corresponds to banks with total assets higher than $1 billion and “small” corresponds to banks with total assets lower or equal to $1 billion. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
*indicate statistical significance at the 10% level. **indicate statistical significance at the 5% level. ***indicate statistical significance at the 1% level. 
 ∆TCR ∆RWA ∆LOAN ∆ASSET DIVIDEND 
 LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL 
!"#$%& ((&) 0.0639 0.983*** 0.371 -0.750*** -2.040** -1.231*** -3.825*** -2.045*** -0.0848 -0.248
*** 
 (0.696) (0.103) (0.931) (0.177) (0.893) (0.176) (0.931) (0.177) (0.0742) (0.0276) 
*+,$%& ((-) 0.129 0.105*** -0.238 -0.209*** -0.566** -0.326*** 0.0443 0.0327 -0.000663 0.00448 
 (0.153) (0.0131) (0.206) (0.0229) (0.243) (0.0234) (0.188) (0.0239) (0.0197) (0.00428) 
./001_345+,$%& ((6) 0.598*** 0.414*** -0.862*** -0.931*** -0.380** -0.474*** 0.455*** 0.193*** -0.0502
*** -0.0144*** 
 (0.0966) (0.0154) (0.129) (0.0308) (0.168) (0.0276) (0.139) (0.0290) (0.0127) (0.00448) 
*+,$%& ∗ !"#$%& ((8) 0.402 0.160*** 0.0256 -0.123 0.774 -0.0479 0.258 -0.102 0.0522 -0.00487 
 (0.489) (0.0529) (0.662) (0.0996) (0.624) (0.0967) (0.769) (0.0862) (0.0469) (0.0116) 
Size	+,$%&  0.103 1.070*** 0.289 -0.971*** -0.412 -1.333*** -2.359*** -2.307*** 0.0163 -0.0948
*** 
 (0.274) (0.0553) (0.370) (0.0678) (0.325) (0.0762) (0.247) (0.0852) (0.0175) (0.0120) 
ROA	+,$%&  0.221*** 0.378*** -0.0228 -0.203*** -0.137** -0.325*** 0.274*** 0.184*** 0.0111
** 0.00444** 
 (0.0359) (0.0115) (0.0466) (0.0166) (0.0533) (0.0172) (0.0490) (0.0137) (0.00459) (0.00185) 
NPL	+,$%&  0.0530** 0.0914*** -0.102*** -0.142*** -0.138*** -0.194*** -0.243*** -0.296*** -0.00259 0.000531 
 (0.0214) (0.00384) (0.0265) (0.00610) (0.0330) (0.00660) (0.0394) (0.00744) (0.00554) (0.000959) 
GDP	growth	$%&  0.0547 0.322*** 0.577** 0.158*** -0.0248 0.203*** -1.142*** -1.021*** -0.00478 -0.0745
*** 
 (0.201) (0.0328) (0.270) (0.0509) (0.253) (0.0514) (0.223) (0.0539) (0.0208) (0.0107) 
!&M+,$%&  0.905*** 1.408*** 3.033*** 3.243*** 2.174*** 3.610*** -15.36*** -13.11*** 0.0183 0.0178*** 
 (0.111) (0.0392) (0.211) (0.0676) (0.244) (0.0777) (0.267) (0.0805) (0.0160) (0.00658) 
Banks fixed effect  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
time fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
(& + (8  0.466 1.143 0.397 -0.874 -1.266 -1.279 -3.567 -2.147 -0.0326 -0.253 
Wald test p value 0.359 0.000 0.551 0.000 0.0495 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.548 0.000 
r2 0.0770 0.210 0.115 0.0893 0.0762 0.130 0.625 0.542 0.415 0.525 
N 17408 249459 17181 248520 17181 248527 17408 249459 17082 237443 
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TABLE 4B: Impact of severe market liquidity shortages (mean plus two times standard deviation) according to gap between actual and target capital  
This table displays the impact of market liquidity shortages on the change in total capital ratio (∆TCR), on the change in asset part of risk weighted assets (∆RWA), on the change in asset part of total loans (∆LOAN), 
on the change in total assets (∆ASSET) and on dividend to total assets ratio (DIVIDEND) according to whether or not the bank is operating below its target total capital ratio.  MLSt-1 is a dummy variable that is equal 
to one if the TED spread is higher at time t-1, than its mean plus two times its standard deviation. Z!,t-1  is a dummy variable that is equal to one if bank i is more reliant on market liquidity (NSFR<100%) at time t-1 
or 0 otherwise. size is the natural logarithm of total assets. ROA is return on asset. NPL is non-performing loans over total loans. Dummy_gap is a dummy variable equals to one if the bank is operating below its 
target total capital ratio or 0 otherwise. GDP growth is the quarterly growth rate of GDP. M&A is a dummy variable for mergers and acquisitions. It is equal to one if the asset growth rate is lower than 10% during 
the quarter and zero otherwise. “large” corresponds to banks with total assets higher than $1 billion and “small” corresponds to banks with total assets lower or equal to $1 billion. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
*indicate statistical significance at the 10% level. **indicate statistical significance at the 5% level. ***indicate statistical significance at the 1% level. 
 ∆TCR ∆RWA ∆LOAN ∆ASSET DIVIDEND 
 LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL 
!"#$%& (w&) 0.271 1.123*** 0.437 -0.887*** -1.359* -1.339*** -3.521*** -2.074*** -0.0991
* -0.247*** 
 (0.563) (0.0925) (0.701) (0.161) (0.718) (0.160) (0.682) (0.167) (0.0600) (0.0262) 
*+,$%& (w-) 0.142 0.111*** -0.237 -0.214*** -0.541** -0.328*** 0.0528 0.0283 0.000939 0.00425 
 (0.156) (0.0129) (0.204) (0.0227) (0.242) (0.0233) (0.185) (0.0237) (0.0195) (0.00423) 
./001_345+,$%& (w6) 0.585*** 0.415*** -0.859*** -0.935*** -0.384** -0.483*** 0.459*** 0.199*** -0.0547
*** -0.0137*** 
 (0.0994) (0.0156) (0.132) (0.0310) (0.170) (0.0279) (0.142) (0.0291) (0.0131) (0.00454) 
./001_345+,$%& ∗ !"#$%& (w8) 0.231 -0.0423 -0.0517 0.108 0.0886 0.182** -0.0670 -0.129* 0.0823
*** -0.0130 
 (0.251) (0.0324) (0.321) (0.0756) (0.343) (0.0734) (0.454) (0.0751) (0.0284) (0.00894) 
Size	+,$%&  0.103 1.073*** 0.289 -0.975*** -0.411 -1.337*** -2.359*** -2.306*** 0.0163 -0.0946
*** 
 (0.274) (0.0554) (0.370) (0.0679) (0.325) (0.0763) (0.247) (0.0853) (0.0176) (0.0120) 
ROA	+,$%&  0.221*** 0.378*** -0.0227 -0.203*** -0.137** -0.324*** 0.274*** 0.183*** 0.0110
** 0.00441** 
 (0.0359) (0.0115) (0.0465) (0.0166) (0.0533) (0.0172) (0.0490) (0.0137) (0.00456) (0.00185) 
NPL	+,$%&  0.0527** 0.0913*** -0.102*** -0.142*** -0.139*** -0.194*** -0.243*** -0.296*** -0.00269 0.000532 
 (0.0214) (0.00384) (0.0265) (0.00610) (0.0330) (0.00660) (0.0395) (0.00745) (0.00553) (0.000959) 
GDP	growth	$%&  0.0551 0.324*** 0.577** 0.155*** -0.0235 0.200*** -1.142*** -1.020*** -0.00480 -0.0744
*** 
 (0.201) (0.0329) (0.270) (0.0510) (0.253) (0.0515) (0.222) (0.0540) (0.0208) (0.0107) 
!&M+,$%&  0.905*** 1.409*** 3.033*** 3.242*** 2.174*** 3.609*** -15.36*** -13.11*** 0.0183 0.0178*** 
 (0.111) (0.0392) (0.210) (0.0676) (0.245) (0.0777) (0.267) (0.0805) (0.0160) (0.00658) 
Banks fixed effect  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
time fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
w& + w8  0.503 1.081 0.385 -0.780 -1.271 -1.156 -3.588 -2.203 -0.0168 -0.260 
Wald test p value 0.320 0.000 0.567 0.000 0.0481 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.756 0.000 
r2 0.0770 0.209 0.115 0.0893 0.0760 0.130 0.625 0.542 0.416 0.525 
N 17408 249459 17181 248520 17181 248527 17408 249459 17082 237443 
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TABLE 5B: Impact of market liquidity shortages on banks’ liquid assets according to bank 
liquidity level 
This table displays the impact of market liquidity shortages on the change in asset part of liquid assets according to whether or 
not the bank is more reliant on market liquidity.  MLSt-1 is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the TED spread is higher 
than its 75th percentile at time t-1. Z!,t-1  is a dummy variable that is equal to one if bank i is more reliant on market liquidity 
(NSFR<100%) at time t-1 or 0 otherwise. size is the natural logarithm of total assets. ROA is return on asset. NPL is non-
performing loans over total loans. Dummy_gap is a dummy variable equals to one if the bank is operating below its target total 
capital ratio (!"#$,&'( > 0) or 0 otherwise. GDP growth is the quarterly growth rate of GDP. M&A is a dummy variable for 
mergers and acquisitions. It is equal to one if the asset growth rate is lower than 10% during the quarter and zero otherwise. 
“large” corresponds to banks with total assets higher than $1 billion and “small” corresponds to banks with total assets lower 
or equal to $1 billion. Standard errors are in parentheses. *indicate statistical significance at the 10% level. **indicate statistical 
significance at the 5% level. ***indicate statistical significance at the 1% level. 
 
 Whole period Non-crisis period 
 LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL 
+,-&'( (/() 1.005 0.0427 0.605 -0.0608 
 (0.805) (0.182) (0.888) (0.182) 
1$,&'( (/2) 0.661*** 0.246*** 0.681*** 0.242*** 
 (0.242) (0.0267) (0.247) (0.0276) 
34556_89:$,&'( (/;) 0.467*** 0.560*** 0.450*** 0.609*** 
 (0.157) (0.0291) (0.168) (0.0311) 
1$,&'( ∗ +,-&'( (/=) -0.0548 0.199*** 0.468 0.161*** 
 (0.371) (0.0446) (0.512) (0.0555) 
Size	$,&'(  0.336 1.138
*** 0.397 0.963*** 
 (0.244) (0.0719) (0.276) (0.0709) 
ROA	$,&'(  0.0403 0.275
*** 0.0795 0.255*** 
 (0.0523) (0.0170) (0.0670) (0.0192) 
NPL	$,&'(  0.101
*** 0.165*** 0.103*** 0.149*** 
 (0.0325) (0.00657) (0.0363) (0.00715) 
GDP	growth	&'(  -0.310 -0.571
*** -0.317 -0.571*** 
 (0.392) (0.110) (0.393) (0.110) 
+&"$,&'(  -1.815
*** -3.639*** -1.613*** -3.619*** 
 (0.254) (0.0867) (0.279) (0.0897) 
Banks fixed effect  yes yes yes yes 
time fixed effect yes yes yes yes 
/( + /=  0.951 0.242 1.073 0.101 
Wald test p value 0.187 0.181 0.143 0.581 
r2 0.0587 0.0992 0.0587 0.101 
N 17408 249449 14841 215743 
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TABLE 6B: Impact of market liquidity shortages on banks’ liquid assets according to gap 
between actual and target capital 
This table displays the impact of market liquidity shortages on the change in asset part of liquid assets according to whether or 
not the bank is operating below its target total capital ratio. MLSt-1 is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the TED spread 
is higher than its 75th percentile at time t-1. Z!,t-1  is a dummy variable that is equal to one if bank i is more reliant on market 
liquidity (NSFR<100%) at time t-1 or 0 otherwise. size is the natural logarithm of total assets. ROA is return on asset. NPL is 
non-performing loans over total loans. Dummy_gap is a dummy variable equals to one if the bank is operating below its target 
total capital ratio (!"#$,&'( > 0) or 0 otherwise. GDP growth is the quarterly growth rate of GDP. M&A is a dummy variable 
for mergers and acquisitions. It is equal to one if the asset growth rate is lower than 10% during the quarter and zero otherwise. 
“large” corresponds to banks with total assets higher than $1 billion and “small” corresponds to banks with total assets lower 
or equal to $1 billion. Standard errors are in parentheses. *indicate statistical significance at the 10% level. **indicate statistical 
significance at the 5% level. ***indicate statistical significance at the 1% level. 
 
 Whole period Non-crisis period 
 LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL 
+,-&'( (w() 0.776 0.131 0.671 -0.00394 
 (0.720) (0.180) (0.744) (0.180) 
1$,&'( (w2) 0.648*** 0.296*** 0.734*** 0.266*** 
 (0.231) (0.0256) (0.241) (0.0267) 
34556_89:$,&'( (w;) 0.413** 0.538*** 0.398** 0.592*** 
 (0.163) (0.0305) (0.172) (0.0319) 
34556_89:$,&'( ∗ +,-&'( (w=) 0.235 0.0911** 0.458 0.138*** 
 (0.251) (0.0376) (0.385) (0.0529) 
Size	$,&'(  0.338 1.142
*** 0.400 0.966*** 
 (0.244) (0.0720) (0.277) (0.0710) 
ROA	$,&'(  0.0401 0.275
*** 0.0791 0.255*** 
 (0.0523) (0.0170) (0.0669) (0.0192) 
NPL	$,&'(  0.101
*** 0.164*** 0.102*** 0.149*** 
 (0.0325) (0.00656) (0.0363) (0.00715) 
GDP	growth	&'(  -0.310 -0.571
*** -0.317 -0.571*** 
 (0.392) (0.110) (0.393) (0.110) 
+&"$,&'(  -1.817
*** -3.638*** -1.609*** -3.619*** 
 (0.254) (0.0867) (0.279) (0.0897) 
Banks fixed effect  yes yes yes yes 
time fixed effect yes yes yes yes 
w( + w=  1.011 0.222 1.129 0.134 
Wald test p value 0.166 0.222 0.134 0.472 
r2 0.0588 0.0992 0.0588 0.101 
N 17408 249449 14841 215743 
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TABLE 7B: adjustment speed of small banks during periods of market liquidity shortage 
 
This table displays the estimations results of equation (11): DSTU$,& = LW$,&'(!"#$,&'( + e$,& using OLS methods. It illustrates 
the speed of adjustment of small banks during period of market liquidity shortages. The market liquidity shortage is measured 
by spikes in TED spread.  Z is a dummy variable equals to one if banks has NSFR lower than 100% or 0 if otherwise. It captures 
banks more reliant on market liquidity. Dummy_gap is a dummy variable equals to one if the bank is operating below its target 
total capital ratio or 0 otherwise. It captures banks operating below their target capital ratio. ∆TCR is change in total capital 
ratio. NPL is non-performing loans to total loans ratio. Standard errors are in parentheses. *indicate statistical significance at 
the 10% level. **indicate statistical significance at the 5% level. ***indicate statistical significance at the 1% level.  
 
 ∆TCR 
1$,&'(  0.0675*** 
 (0.00631) 
34556_89:$,&'(  0.126*** 
 (0.0113) 
NPL	$,&'(  -0.00678*** 
 (0.00176) 
constant -0.387*** 
 (0.0366) 
Time fixed effect yes 
r2 0.0359 
N 64023 
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APPENDIX C 
TABLE 1C: Impact of market liquidity shortages according to banks liquidity level, using the 10th percentile of NSFR 
This table displays the impact of market liquidity shortages on the change in total capital ratio (∆TCR), on the change in asset part of risk weighted assets (∆RWA), on the change in asset part of total loans (∆LOAN), 
on the change in total assets (∆ASSET) and on dividend to total assets ratio (DIVIDEND) according to whether or not the bank is more reliant on market liquidity.  MLSt-1 is a dummy variable that is equal to one if 
the TED spread is higher than its 75th percentile at time t-1. Z!,t-1  is a dummy variable that is equal to one if bank i is more reliant on market liquidity at time t-1 or 0 otherwise. We consider that banks have a low 
level of liquidity if their NSFR is lower than the 10th percentile; size is the natural logarithm of total assets. ROA is return on asset. NPL is non-performing loans over total loans. Dummy_gap is a dummy variable 
equals to one if the bank is operating below its target total capital ratio or 0 otherwise. GDP growth is the quarterly growth rate of GDP. M&A is a dummy variable for mergers and acquisitions. It is equal to one if 
the asset growth rate is lower than 10% during the quarter and zero otherwise. “large” corresponds to banks with total assets higher than $1 billion and “small” corresponds to banks with total assets lower or equal 
to $1 billion. Standard errors are in parentheses. *indicate statistical significance at the 10% level. **indicate statistical significance at the 5% level. ***indicate statistical significance at the 1% level. 
 ∆TCR ∆RWA ∆LOAN ∆ASSET DIVIDEND 
 LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL 
!"#$%& ((&) -0.496 0.320
*** 1.269* -0.500*** -0.111 -0.507*** -0.0141 -0.441** 0.0754* 0.0471* 
 (0.576) (0.0963) (0.712) (0.155) (0.729) (0.151) (0.622) (0.171) (0.0445) (0.0256) 
*+,$%& ((-) -0.0570 0.00230 0.0148 -0.123
*** -0.188 -0.230*** -0.0261 -0.0325 0.000943 0.00551 
 (0.0723) (0.0132) (0.134) (0.0240) (0.148) (0.0256) (0.140) (0.0279) (0.0103) (0.00383) 
./001_345+,$%& ((6) 0.599
*** 0.415*** -0.858*** -0.932*** -0.379** -0.477*** 0.454*** 0.193*** -0.0499*** -0.0143*** 
 (0.0963) (0.0154) (0.129) (0.0308) (0.168) (0.0276) (0.140) (0.0290) (0.0126) (0.00447) 
*+,$%& ∗ !"#$%& ((8) 0.140 0.139
*** -0.338** -0.290*** -0.195 -0.288*** 0.119 0.0980** -0.0138 0.000783 
 (0.0966) (0.0194) (0.172) (0.0385) (0.185) (0.0373) (0.196) (0.0403) (0.0184) (0.00567) 
Size	+,$%&  0.113 1.076
*** 0.286 -0.966*** -0.422 -1.330*** -2.358*** -2.309*** 0.0169 -0.0949*** 
 (0.273) (0.0555) (0.368) (0.0679) (0.324) (0.0764) (0.248) (0.0852) (0.0176) (0.0120) 
ROA	+,$%&  0.223
*** 0.381*** -0.0263 -0.207*** -0.140*** -0.330*** 0.275*** 0.185*** 0.0110** 0.00447** 
 (0.0359) (0.0115) (0.0463) (0.0167) (0.0529) (0.0173) (0.0489) (0.0137) (0.00454) (0.00185) 
NPL	+,$%&  0.0555
** 0.0955*** -0.103*** -0.140*** -0.138*** -0.191*** -0.242*** -0.294*** -0.00255 0.000335 
 (0.0216) (0.00392) (0.0270) (0.00630) (0.0330) (0.00684) (0.0392) (0.00764) (0.00549) (0.00103) 
GDP	growth	$%&  0.268 0.137
** 0.0259 0.457*** 0.0791 0.503*** -1.173*** -0.809*** -0.0395** -0.0989*** 
 (0.307) (0.0544) (0.297) (0.0934) (0.373) (0.0916) (0.270) (0.0989) (0.0192) (0.0112) 
!&M+,$%&  0.906
*** 1.410*** 3.035*** 3.243*** 2.174*** 3.609*** -15.36*** -13.11*** 0.0185 0.0178*** 
 (0.112) (0.0392) (0.210) (0.0676) (0.245) (0.0777) (0.267) (0.0805) (0.0160) (0.00658) 
Banks fixed effect  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
time fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
(& + (8  -0.355 0.459 0.931 -0.790 -0.306 -0.795 0.104 -0.343 0.0616 0.0479 
Wald test p value 0.527 0.000 0.180 0.000 0.667 0.000 0.862 0.0476 0.130 0.0586 
r2 0.0768 0.209 0.116 0.0894 0.0756 0.130 0.625 0.542 0.415 0.525 
N 17408 249459 17181 248520 17181 248527 17408 249459 17082 237443 
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TABLE 2C: Impact of severe market liquidity shortages (90th percentile) according to banks liquidity level, using the 10th percentile of NSFR 
This table displays the impact of market liquidity shortages on the change in total capital ratio (∆TCR), on the change in asset part of risk weighted assets (∆RWA), on the change in asset part of total loans (∆LOAN), 
on the change in total assets (∆ASSET) and on dividend to total assets ratio (DIVIDEND) according to whether or not the bank is more reliant on market liquidity.  MLSt-1 is a dummy variable that is equal to one if 
the TED spread is higher than its 90th percentile at time t-1. Z!,t-1  is a dummy variable that is equal to one if bank i is more reliant on market liquidity at time t-1 or 0 otherwise. We consider that banks have a low 
level of liquidity if their NSFR is lower than the 10th percentile; size is the natural logarithm of total assets. ROA is return on asset. NPL is non-performing loans over total loans. Dummy_gap is a dummy variable 
equals to one if the bank is operating below its target total capital ratio or 0 otherwise. GDP growth is the quarterly growth rate of GDP. M&A is a dummy variable for mergers and acquisitions. It is equal to one if 
the asset growth rate is lower than 10% during the quarter and zero otherwise. “large” corresponds to banks with total assets higher than $1 billion and “small” corresponds to banks with total assets lower or equal 
to $1 billion. Standard errors are in parentheses. *indicate statistical significance at the 10% level. **indicate statistical significance at the 5% level. ***indicate statistical significance at the 1% level. 
 ∆TCR ∆RWA ∆LOAN ∆ASSET DIVIDEND 
 LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL 
!"#$%& ((&) 0.222 1.059
*** 0.595 -0.753*** -1.396** -1.205*** -3.578*** -2.153*** -0.0253 -0.248*** 
 (0.552) (0.0917) (0.725) (0.160) (0.683) (0.160) (0.626) (0.166) (0.0583) (0.0266) 
*+,$%& ((-) -0.0518 0.0257** -0.0455 -0.176*** -0.246* -0.286*** 0.00362 -0.0134 -0.00145 0.00658
* 
 (0.0663) (0.0125) (0.128) (0.0231) (0.141) (0.0245) (0.133) (0.0267) (0.00901) (0.00364) 
./001_345+,$%& ((6) 0.601*** 0.415*** -0.864*** -0.932*** -0.383** -0.477*** 0.456*** 0.194*** -0.0501
*** -0.0143*** 
 (0.0960) (0.0154) (0.129) (0.0308) (0.168) (0.0276) (0.139) (0.0290) (0.0127) (0.00447) 
*+,$%& ∗ !"#$%& ((8) 0.279** 0.117*** -0.248 -0.212*** 0.0654 -0.184*** 0.0107 0.0618 -0.00964 -0.00673 
 (0.136) (0.0265) (0.229) (0.0523) (0.207) (0.0546) (0.247) (0.0555) (0.0231) (0.00691) 
Size	+,$%&  0.110 1.079*** 0.285 -0.973*** -0.427 -1.338*** -2.356*** -2.306*** 0.0169 -0.0947
*** 
 (0.274) (0.0555) (0.370) (0.0680) (0.325) (0.0766) (0.248) (0.0851) (0.0175) (0.0120) 
ROA	+,$%&  0.223*** 0.380*** -0.0252 -0.206*** -0.139*** -0.328*** 0.274*** 0.185*** 0.0110
** 0.00443** 
 (0.0358) (0.0115) (0.0463) (0.0167) (0.0528) (0.0173) (0.0489) (0.0137) (0.00455) (0.00185) 
NPL	+,$%&  0.0554** 0.0948*** -0.103*** -0.139*** -0.137*** -0.189*** -0.243*** -0.294*** -0.00253 0.000300 
 (0.0216) (0.00391) (0.0269) (0.00629) (0.0329) (0.00684) (0.0392) (0.00764) (0.00549) (0.00103) 
GDP	growth	$%&  0.0517 0.323
*** 0.575** 0.155*** -0.0459 0.197*** -1.141*** -1.023*** -0.00447 -0.0742*** 
 (0.203) (0.0328) (0.270) (0.0510) (0.253) (0.0515) (0.224) (0.0539) (0.0208) (0.0107) 
!&M+,$%&  0.907*** 1.410*** 3.032*** 3.242*** 2.172*** 3.608*** -15.36*** -13.11*** 0.0184 0.0178
*** 
 (0.112) (0.0392) (0.210) (0.0676) (0.245) (0.0777) (0.267) (0.0805) (0.0160) (0.00658) 
Banks fixed effect  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
time fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
(& + (8  0.501 1.177 0.347 -0.965 -1.331 -1.389 -3.568 -2.091 -0.0349 -0.255 
Wald test p value 0.324 0.000 0.598 0.000 0.0385 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.525 2.09e-23 
r2 0.0770 0.209 0.115 0.0893 0.0755 0.130 0.625 0.542 0.415 0.525 
N 17408 249459 17181 248520 17181 248527 17408 249459 17082 237443 
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TABLE 3C: Impact of severe market liquidity shortages (mean plus two times standard deviation) according to banks liquidity level, using the 10th percentile of 
NSFR 
This table displays the impact of market liquidity shortages on the change in total capital ratio (∆TCR), on the change in asset part of risk weighted assets (∆RWA), on the change in asset part of total loans (∆LOAN), 
on the change in total assets (∆ASSET) and on dividend to total assets ratio (DIVIDEND) according to whether or not the bank is more reliant on market liquidity.  MLSt-1 is a dummy variable that is equal to one if 
the TED spread is higher than its mean plus two times its standard deviation at time t-1. Z!,t-1  is a dummy variable that is equal to one if bank i is more reliant on market liquidity at time t-1 or 0 otherwise. We 
consider that banks have a low level of liquidity if their NSFR is lower than the 10th percentile; size is the natural logarithm of total assets. ROA is return on asset. NPL is non-performing loans over total loans. 
Dummy_gap is a dummy variable equals to one if the bank is operating below its target total capital ratio or 0 otherwise. GDP growth is the quarterly growth rate of GDP. M&A is a dummy variable for mergers and 
acquisitions. It is equal to one if the asset growth rate is lower than 10% during the quarter and zero otherwise. “large” corresponds to banks with total assets higher than $1 billion and “small” corresponds to banks 
with total assets lower or equal to $1 billion. Standard errors are in parentheses. *indicate statistical significance at the 10% level. **indicate statistical significance at the 5% level. ***indicate statistical significance 
at the 1% level. 
 ∆TCR ∆RWA ∆LOAN ∆ASSET DIVIDEND 
 LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL 
!"#$%& ((&) 0.170 1.090
*** 0.465 -0.864*** -1.635** -1.370*** -3.594*** -2.149*** -0.0490 -0.255*** 
 (0.563) (0.0937) (0.770) (0.164) (0.711) (0.163) (0.675) (0.168) (0.0582) (0.0267) 
*+,$%& ((-) -0.0376 0.0365
*** -0.0676 -0.202*** -0.255* -0.316*** 0.00338 -0.00922 -0.00338 0.00532 
 (0.0626) (0.0122) (0.124) (0.0227) (0.136) (0.0240) (0.127) (0.0261) (0.00820) (0.00354) 
./001_345+,$%& ((6) 0.602*** 0.415*** -0.864*** -0.932*** -0.382** -0.477*** 0.457*** 0.194*** -0.0501
*** -0.0143*** 
 (0.0962) (0.0154) (0.129) (0.0308) (0.168) (0.0276) (0.139) (0.0290) (0.0127) (0.00447) 
*+,$%& ∗ !"#$%& ((8) 0.343* 0.0637* -0.105 -0.0122 0.339 0.117 0.0288 0.0577 0.0173 0.00603 
 (0.207) (0.0342) (0.365) (0.0782) (0.295) (0.0745) (0.381) (0.0751) (0.0197) (0.00844) 
Size	+,$%&  0.112 1.082*** 0.281 -0.979*** -0.428 -1.346*** -2.356*** -2.305*** 0.0165 -0.0950
*** 
 (0.273) (0.0555) (0.369) (0.0681) (0.325) (0.0766) (0.247) (0.0850) (0.0176) (0.0120) 
ROA	+,$%&  0.223*** 0.380*** -0.0243 -0.205*** -0.138*** -0.327*** 0.274*** 0.184*** 0.0111
** 0.00448** 
 (0.0358) (0.0115) (0.0463) (0.0167) (0.0529) (0.0173) (0.0490) (0.0137) (0.00454) (0.00185) 
NPL	+,$%&  0.0551** 0.0944*** -0.102*** -0.138*** -0.138*** -0.188*** -0.243*** -0.294*** -0.00252 0.000338 
 (0.0216) (0.00390) (0.0269) (0.00628) (0.0329) (0.00683) (0.0392) (0.00763) (0.00549) (0.00103) 
GDP	growth	$%&  0.0545 0.325
*** 0.570** 0.150*** -0.0483 0.191*** -1.141*** -1.022*** -0.00496 -0.0745*** 
 (0.203) (0.0328) (0.270) (0.0510) (0.253) (0.0515) (0.224) (0.0538) (0.0208) (0.0107) 
!&M+,$%&  0.906*** 1.411*** 3.032*** 3.241*** 2.171*** 3.606*** -15.36*** -13.11*** 0.0183 0.0178
*** 
 (0.112) (0.0392) (0.210) (0.0677) (0.245) (0.0778) (0.267) (0.0805) (0.0160) (0.00658) 
Banks fixed effect  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
time fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
(& + (8  0.513 1.154 0.361 -0.876 -1.295 -1.253 -3.565 -2.092 -0.0317 -0.249 
Wald test p value 0.313 0.000 0.584 0.000 0.0438 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.563 1.86e-22 
r2 0.0770 0.209 0.115 0.0892 0.0756 0.130 0.625 0.542 0.415 0.525 
N 17408 249459 17181 248520 17181 248527 17408 249459 17082 237443 
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APPENDIX D 
TABLE 1D: Impact of market liquidity shortages according to banks liquidity level, using loans to core deposits ratio 
This table displays the impact of market liquidity shortages on the change in total capital ratio (∆TCR), on the change in asset part of risk weighted assets (∆RWA), on the change in asset part of total loans (∆LOAN), 
on the change in total assets (∆ASSET) and on dividend to total assets ratio (DIVIDEND) according to whether or not the bank is more reliant on market liquidity.  MLSt-1 is a dummy variable that is equal to one if 
the TED spread is higher than its 75th percentile at time t-1. Z!,t-1  is a dummy variable that is equal to one if bank i is more reliant on market liquidity at time t-1 or 0 otherwise. We assume that banks have a low 
liquidity level if its loans to core deposits ratio is higher than 100%. size is the natural logarithm of total assets. ROA is return on asset. NPL is non-performing loans over total loans. Dummy_gap is a dummy variable 
equals to one if the bank is operating below its target total capital ratio or 0 otherwise. GDP growth is the quarterly growth rate of GDP. M&A is a dummy variable for mergers and acquisitions. It is equal to one if 
the asset growth rate is lower than 10% during the quarter and zero otherwise. “large” corresponds to banks with total assets higher than $1 billion and “small” corresponds to banks with total assets lower or equal 
to $1 billion. Standard errors are in parentheses. *indicate statistical significance at the 10% level. **indicate statistical significance at the 5% level. ***indicate statistical significance at the 1% level. 
 ∆TCR ∆RWA ∆LOAN ∆ASSET DIVIDEND 
 LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL 
!"#$%& ((&) -0.647 0.309
*** 1.178* -0.383** 0.0546 -0.364** -0.134 -0.533*** 0.0512 0.0489* 
 (0.539) (0.0948) (0.707) (0.154) (0.711) (0.149) (0.597) (0.171) (0.0398) (0.0255) 
*+,$%& ((-) 0.0916 0.217*** -0.403** -1.026*** -0.950*** -1.471*** 0.765*** 0.801*** 0.00730 -0.00553 
 (0.0846) (0.0229) (0.171) (0.0409) (0.173) (0.0450) (0.170) (0.0472) (0.0189) (0.00531) 
./001_345+,$%& ((6) 0.554*** 0.403*** -0.774*** -0.877*** -0.336** -0.403*** 0.450*** 0.154*** -0.0475
*** -0.0140*** 
 (0.0952) (0.0153) (0.127) (0.0310) (0.171) (0.0279) (0.137) (0.0289) (0.0123) (0.00449) 
*+,$%& ∗ !"#$%& ((8) 0.0190 0.0414 -0.292* -0.235*** 0.0187 -0.0361 0.0181 -0.0606 -0.0105 -0.000587 
 (0.0733) (0.0257) (0.167) (0.0467) (0.167) (0.0478) (0.194) (0.0535) (0.0160) (0.00645) 
Size	+,$%&  -0.0435 1.046*** 0.245 -0.824*** -0.439 -1.155*** -2.385*** -2.428*** -0.000227 -0.0934
*** 
 (0.246) (0.0550) (0.390) (0.0667) (0.339) (0.0750) (0.255) (0.0877) (0.0152) (0.0122) 
ROA	+,$%&  0.221*** 0.381*** -0.0309 -0.209*** -0.129** -0.332*** 0.282*** 0.186*** 0.0121
*** 0.00452** 
 (0.0363) (0.0115) (0.0471) (0.0168) (0.0523) (0.0174) (0.0500) (0.0138) (0.00345) (0.00184) 
NPL	+,$%&  0.0544** 0.0998*** -0.107*** -0.162*** -0.129*** -0.224*** -0.238*** -0.288*** 0.00170 0.000713 
 (0.0222) (0.00380) (0.0278) (0.00609) (0.0318) (0.00666) (0.0402) (0.00731) (0.00214) (0.000969) 
GDP	growth	$%&  0.270 0.137
** 0.0200 0.461*** 0.0294 0.508*** -1.163*** -0.810*** -0.0406** -0.0990*** 
 (0.309) (0.0544) (0.297) (0.0933) (0.372) (0.0914) (0.270) (0.0989) (0.0191) (0.0112) 
!&M+,$%&  0.825*** 1.420*** 3.099*** 3.187*** 2.203*** 3.537*** -15.16*** -13.06*** 0.0213 0.0176
*** 
 (0.104) (0.0394) (0.211) (0.0678) (0.242) (0.0781) (0.252) (0.0812) (0.0147) (0.00665) 
Banks fixed effect  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
time fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
(& + (8  -0.628 0.350 0.885 -0.618 0.0733 -0.400 -0.115 -0.594 0.0407 0.0483 
Wald test p value 0.248 0.000 0.211 0.000 0.917 0.0103 0.849 0.001 0.311 0.0632 
r2 0.0764 0.213 0.120 0.0947 0.0862 0.139 0.626 0.543 0.421 0.524 
N 17049 248268 17049 248265 17049 248268 17049 248268 16724 236262 
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TABLE 2D: Impact of market liquidity shortages according to banks liquidity level, using liquid assets to total assets ratio 
This table displays the impact of market liquidity shortages on the change in total capital ratio (∆TCR), on the change in asset part of risk weighted assets (∆RWA), on the change in asset part of total loans (∆LOAN), 
on the change in total assets (∆ASSET) and on dividend to total assets ratio (DIVIDEND) according to whether or not the bank is more reliant on market liquidity.  MLSt-1 is a dummy variable that is equal to one if 
the TED spread is higher than its 75th percentile at time t-1. Z!,t-1  is a dummy variable that is equal to one if bank i is more reliant on market liquidity at time t-1 or 0 otherwise. We assume that banks have a low 
liquidity level if its liquid assets to total assets ratio is lower than the 25th percentile of this variable. size is the natural logarithm of total assets. ROA is return on asset. NPL is non-performing loans over total loans. 
Dummy_gap is a dummy variable equals to one if the bank is operating below its target total capital ratio or 0 otherwise. GDP growth is the quarterly growth rate of GDP. M&A is a dummy variable for mergers and 
acquisitions. It is equal to one if the asset growth rate is lower than 10% during the quarter and zero otherwise. “large” corresponds to banks with total assets higher than $1 billion and “small” corresponds to banks 
with total assets lower or equal to $1 billion. Standard errors are in parentheses. *indicate statistical significance at the 10% level. **indicate statistical significance at the 5% level. ***indicate statistical significance 
at the 1% level. 
 ∆TCR ∆RWA ∆LOAN ∆ASSET DIVIDEND 
 LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL 
!"#$%& ((&) -0.460 0.315
*** 1.165* -0.385** -0.207 -0.347** -0.0581 -0.547*** 0.0717* 0.0488* 
 (0.564) (0.0960) (0.700) (0.153) (0.714) (0.148) (0.603) (0.170) (0.0421) (0.0255) 
*+,$%& ((-) 0.0387 0.0986*** -0.724*** -1.182*** -1.258*** -1.677*** 0.653*** 1.127*** -0.00388 -0.00203 
 (0.0394) (0.0140) (0.0933) (0.0297) (0.134) (0.0339) (0.116) (0.0325) (0.0110) (0.00436) 
./001_345+,$%& ((6) 0.592*** 0.398*** -0.756*** -0.770*** -0.211 -0.253*** 0.356** 0.0442 -0.0493
*** -0.0139*** 
 (0.0973) (0.0154) (0.129) (0.0316) (0.169) (0.0283) (0.139) (0.0290) (0.0129) (0.00448) 
*+,$%& ∗ !"#$%& ((8) 0.150** 0.162*** -0.282* -0.252*** -0.0267 -0.174*** 0.314* -0.0265 -0.0110 -0.00436 
 (0.0602) (0.0199) (0.145) (0.0387) (0.161) (0.0388) (0.167) (0.0416) (0.0114) (0.00562) 
Size	+,$%&  0.109 1.065*** 0.304 -0.848*** -0.404 -1.172*** -2.385*** -2.433*** 0.0168 -0.0937
*** 
 (0.275) (0.0552) (0.370) (0.0671) (0.323) (0.0754) (0.258) (0.0861) (0.0176) (0.0120) 
ROA	+,$%&  0.223*** 0.380*** -0.0255 -0.199*** -0.140*** -0.320*** 0.276*** 0.177*** 0.0110
** 0.00450** 
 (0.0357) (0.0114) (0.0459) (0.0165) (0.0525) (0.0171) (0.0494) (0.0138) (0.00451) (0.00185) 
NPL	+,$%&  0.0559*** 0.0982*** -0.115*** -0.159*** -0.159*** -0.220*** -0.233*** -0.290*** -0.00269 0.000747 
 (0.0216) (0.00376) (0.0270) (0.00611) (0.0343) (0.00672) (0.0391) (0.00725) (0.00545) (0.000967) 
GDP	growth	$%&  0.268 0.140
** 0.0178 0.422*** 0.0649 0.454*** -1.166*** -0.773*** -0.0396** -0.0991*** 
 (0.307) (0.0544) (0.293) (0.0923) (0.367) (0.0900) (0.268) (0.0985) (0.0192) (0.0112) 
!&M+,$%&  0.909*** 1.420*** 3.005*** 3.165*** 2.126*** 3.501*** -15.33*** -13.05*** 0.0182 0.0178
*** 
 (0.112) (0.0393) (0.210) (0.0674) (0.245) (0.0775) (0.267) (0.0811) (0.0161) (0.00660) 
Banks fixed effect  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
time fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
(& + (8  -0.310 0.477 0.882 -0.636 -0.234 -0.521 0.256 -0.573 0.0607 0.0444 
Wald test p value 0.583 0.000 0.202 0.000 0.740 0.001 0.674 0.001 0.139 0.0826 
r2 0.0770 0.210 0.121 0.0990 0.0880 0.150 0.627 0.546 0.415 0.525 
N 17408 249454 17181 248519 17181 248522 17408 249454 17082 237438 
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TABLE 3D: Impact of market liquidity shortages according to banks liquidity level, using the reliance on wholesale funding 
This table displays the impact of market liquidity shortages on the change in total capital ratio (∆TCR), on the change in asset part of risk weighted assets (∆RWA), on the change in asset part of total loans (∆LOAN), 
on the change in total assets (∆ASSET) and on dividend to total assets ratio (DIVIDEND) according to whether or not the bank is more reliant on market liquidity.  MLSt-1 is a dummy variable that is equal to one if 
the TED spread is higher than its 75th percentile at time t-1. Z!,t-1  is a dummy variable that is equal to one if bank i is more reliant on market liquidity at time t-1 or 0 otherwise. We assume that banks have a low 
liquidity level if its reliance on wholesale funding is higher than the 75th percentile of this variable. size is the natural logarithm of total assets. ROA is return on asset. NPL is non-performing loans over total loans. 
Dummy_gap is a dummy variable equals to one if the bank is operating below its target total capital ratio or 0 otherwise. GDP growth is the quarterly growth rate of GDP. M&A is a dummy variable for mergers and 
acquisitions. It is equal to one if the asset growth rate is lower than 10% during the quarter and zero otherwise. “large” corresponds to banks with total assets higher than $1 billion and “small” corresponds to banks 
with total assets lower or equal to $1 billion. Standard errors are in parentheses. *indicate statistical significance at the 10% level. **indicate statistical significance at the 5% level. ***indicate statistical significance 
at the 1% level. 
 ∆TCR ∆RWA ∆LOAN ∆ASSET DIVIDEND 
 LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL 
!"#$%& ((&) -0.397 0.341
*** 1.021 -0.512*** -0.188 -0.510*** 0.0384 -0.431** 0.0726* 0.0500* 
 (0.572) (0.0960) (0.712) (0.155) (0.729) (0.150) (0.609) (0.171) (0.0434) (0.0255) 
*+,$%& ((-) -0.0261 0.0261 0.198** -0.236*** 0.175 -0.310*** -0.195 -0.0378 0.00383 -0.00669 
 (0.0647) (0.0204) (0.0987) (0.0330) (0.122) (0.0363) (0.125) (0.0405) (0.0114) (0.00543) 
./001_345+,$%& ((6) 0.593*** 0.414*** -0.869*** -0.926*** -0.390** -0.470*** 0.460*** 0.198*** -0.0508
*** -0.0141*** 
 (0.0964) (0.0155) (0.129) (0.0308) (0.167) (0.0276) (0.140) (0.0291) (0.0128) (0.00449) 
*+,$%& ∗ !"#$%& ((8) 0.00974 0.0993*** -0.0299 -0.226*** -0.118 -0.233*** 0.120 0.134*** -0.00999 -0.00659 
 (0.0542) (0.0240) (0.143) (0.0419) (0.144) (0.0402) (0.172) (0.0464) (0.0124) (0.00583) 
Size	+,$%&  0.122 1.075*** 0.254 -0.932*** -0.464 -1.295*** -2.328*** -2.310*** 0.0156 -0.0924
*** 
 (0.277) (0.0559) (0.372) (0.0678) (0.326) (0.0764) (0.249) (0.0863) (0.0182) (0.0122) 
ROA	+,$%&  0.223*** 0.380*** -0.0229 -0.210*** -0.140*** -0.334*** 0.273*** 0.186*** 0.0111
** 0.00443** 
 (0.0360) (0.0115) (0.0463) (0.0167) (0.0530) (0.0173) (0.0495) (0.0138) (0.00453) (0.00185) 
NPL	+,$%&  0.0539** 0.0977*** -0.104*** -0.154*** -0.143*** -0.212*** -0.241*** -0.294*** -0.00259 0.000749 
 (0.0216) (0.00378) (0.0262) (0.00598) (0.0333) (0.00651) (0.0396) (0.00734) (0.00550) (0.000969) 
GDP	growth	$%&  0.268 0.137
** 0.0263 0.459*** 0.0797 0.507*** -1.174*** -0.809*** -0.0396** -0.0990*** 
 (0.307) (0.0544) (0.297) (0.0934) (0.373) (0.0916) (0.270) (0.0989) (0.0192) (0.0112) 
!&M+,$%&  0.902*** 1.409*** 3.034*** 3.233*** 2.171*** 3.596*** -15.36*** -13.11*** 0.0191 0.0181
*** 
 (0.113) (0.0393) (0.210) (0.0677) (0.245) (0.0779) (0.268) (0.0808) (0.0162) (0.00662) 
Banks fixed effect  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
time fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
(& + (8  -0.387 0.441 0.991 -0.738 -0.306 -0.743 0.158 -0.297 0.0626 0.0434 
Wald test p value 0.486 0.000 0.152 0.000 0.664 0.000 0.795 0.0903 0.133 0.0893 
r2 0.0768 0.209 0.116 0.0893 0.0753 0.130 0.626 0.542 0.415 0.524 
N 17181 248482 17181 248475 17181 248482 17181 248482 16856 236473 
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APPENDIX E 
TABLE 1E: Impact of market liquidity shortages (using the sample of “real commercial banks”) according to banks liquidity level 
Depending on whether or not the bank is more reliant on market liquidity, this table displays the impact of market liquidity shortages on the change in total capital ratio (∆TCR), on the change in asset part of risk 
weighted assets (∆RWA), on the change in asset part of total loans (∆LOAN), on the change in total assets (∆ASSET) and on dividend to total assets ratio (DIVIDEND) of “real commercial banks”. “real commercial 
banks” are banks with total deposits to total assets ratio and total loans over total assets higher than 30%.  MLSt-1 is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the TED spread is higher than its 75th percentile at time t-
1. Z!,t-1  is a dummy variable that is equal to one if bank i is more reliant on market liquidity (NSFR<100%) at time t-1 or 0 otherwise. size is the natural logarithm of total assets. ROA is return on asset. NPL is non-
performing loans over total loans. Dummy_gap is a dummy variable equals to one if the bank is operating below its target total capital ratio or 0 otherwise. GDP growth is the quarterly growth rate of GDP. M&A is 
a dummy variable for mergers and acquisitions. It is equal to one if the asset growth rate is lower than 10% during the quarter and zero otherwise. “large” corresponds to banks with total assets higher than $1 billion 
and “small” corresponds to banks with total assets lower or equal to $1 billion. Standard errors are in parentheses. *indicate statistical significance at the 10% level. **indicate statistical significance at the 5% level. 
***indicate statistical significance at the 1% level. 
 ∆TCR ∆RWA ∆LOAN ∆ASSET DIVIDEND 
 LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL 
!"#$%& ((&) -0.142 0.343
*** 1.174 -0.480*** -0.622 -0.566*** 0.0347 -0.502*** 0.0548 0.0495* 
 (0.450) (0.0931) (0.803) (0.158) (0.856) (0.155) (0.670) (0.174) (0.0478) (0.0264) 
*+,$%& ((-) 0.0834 0.0660
*** -0.245 -0.150*** -0.508* -0.271*** 0.233 0.00593 0.00185 0.00678 
 (0.153) (0.0135) (0.224) (0.0240) (0.275) (0.0251) (0.200) (0.0259) (0.0224) (0.00470) 
./001_345+,$%& ((6) 0.633*** 0.393*** -0.966*** -0.919*** -0.481*** -0.462*** 0.488*** 0.196*** -0.0512
*** -0.0147*** 
 (0.0942) (0.0150) (0.139) (0.0302) (0.176) (0.0276) (0.140) (0.0289) (0.0134) (0.00449) 
*+,$%& ∗ !"#$%& ((8) 0.0687 0.171*** -0.392 -0.266*** -0.100 -0.241*** -0.252 0.0351 0.0121 -0.00724 
 (0.157) (0.0234) (0.403) (0.0425) (0.444) (0.0409) (0.344) (0.0398) (0.0246) (0.00679) 
Size	+,$%&  0.182 1.197*** 0.306 -1.041*** -0.583 -1.510*** -2.426*** -2.356*** 0.0235 -0.0956
*** 
 (0.289) (0.0540) (0.399) (0.0674) (0.377) (0.0780) (0.263) (0.0864) (0.0183) (0.0124) 
ROA	+,$%&  0.206*** 0.407*** -0.0299 -0.201*** -0.135** -0.348*** 0.293*** 0.193*** 0.00857
** 0.00507*** 
 (0.0282) (0.0109) (0.0514) (0.0159) (0.0580) (0.0170) (0.0485) (0.0136) (0.00431) (0.00175) 
NPL	+,$%&  0.0561*** 0.100*** -0.107*** -0.144*** -0.150*** -0.203*** -0.272*** -0.302*** -0.00321 0.000514 
 (0.0197) (0.00381) (0.0275) (0.00612) (0.0382) (0.00675) (0.0375) (0.00737) (0.00586) (0.000961) 
GDP	growth	$%&  0.191 0.173
*** 0.180 0.422*** 0.186 0.485*** -1.115*** -0.775*** -0.0352* -0.0976*** 
 (0.156) (0.0513) (0.251) (0.0928) (0.324) (0.0918) (0.266) (0.100) (0.0182) (0.0113) 
!&M+,$%&  0.784*** 1.355*** 2.938*** 3.267*** 2.235*** 3.695*** -15.19*** -12.89*** 0.0193 0.0201
*** 
 (0.101) (0.0371) (0.225) (0.0678) (0.257) (0.0782) (0.264) (0.0772) (0.0173) (0.00659) 
Banks fixed effect  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
time fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
(& + (8  -0.0729 0.514 0.783 -0.746 -0.722 -0.807 -0.217 -0.467 0.0669 0.0423 
Wald test p value 0.851 0.000 0.236 0.000 0.298 0.000 0.712 0.007 0.101 0.101 
r2 0.106 0.242 0.119 0.0938 0.0840 0.137 0.627 0.538 0.427 0.527 
N 16711 240378 16484 239439 16484 239446 16711 240378 16397 228750 
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TABLE 2E: Impact of market liquidity shortages (using the sample of “real commercial banks”) according to gap between actual and target capital 
Depending on whether or not the bank is operating below its target total capital ratio, this table displays the impact of market liquidity shortages on the change in total capital ratio (∆TCR), on the change in asset part 
of risk weighted assets (∆RWA), on the change in asset part of total loans (∆LOAN), on the change in total assets (∆ASSET) and on dividend to total assets ratio (DIVIDEND) of “real commercial banks”. “real 
commercial banks” are banks with total deposits to total assets ratio and total loans over total assets higher than 30%.  MLSt-1 is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the TED spread is higher than its 75th percentile 
at time t-1. Z!,t-1  is a dummy variable that is equal to one if bank i is more reliant on market liquidity (NSFR<100%) at time t-1 or 0 otherwise. size is the natural logarithm of total assets. ROA is return on asset. NPL 
is non-performing loans over total loans. Dummy_gap is a dummy variable equals to one if the bank is operating below its target total capital ratio or 0 otherwise. GDP growth is the quarterly growth rate of GDP. 
M&A is a dummy variable for mergers and acquisitions. It is equal to one if the asset growth rate is lower than 10% during the quarter and zero otherwise. “large” corresponds to banks with total assets higher than 
$1 billion and “small” corresponds to banks with total assets lower or equal to $1 billion. Standard errors are in parentheses. *indicate statistical significance at the 10% level. **indicate statistical significance at the 
5% level. ***indicate statistical significance at the 1% level. 
 ∆TCR ∆RWA ∆LOAN ∆ASSET DIVIDEND 
 LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL 
!"#$%& (w&) -0.276 0.404*** 1.019 -0.559*** -0.737 -0.664*** -0.271 -0.483*** 0.0675 0.0469
* 
 (0.385) (0.0919) (0.650) (0.157) (0.721) (0.153) (0.621) (0.173) (0.0414) (0.0261) 
*+,$%& (w-) 0.0961 0.109*** -0.325 -0.216*** -0.529** -0.331*** 0.181 0.0146 0.00422 0.00527 
 (0.133) (0.0127) (0.216) (0.0228) (0.262) (0.0238) (0.181) (0.0241) (0.0201) (0.00435) 
./001_345+,$%& (w6) 0.576*** 0.359*** -0.908*** -0.853*** -0.488*** -0.426*** 0.465*** 0.195*** -0.0507
*** -0.0137*** 
 (0.107) (0.0159) (0.162) (0.0312) (0.180) (0.0289) (0.143) (0.0302) (0.0151) (0.00477) 
./001_345+,$%& ∗ !"#$%& (w8) 0.248 0.139*** -0.253 -0.273*** 0.0303 -0.152*** 0.0957 0.00231 -0.00228 -0.00448 
 (0.173) (0.0173) (0.282) (0.0365) (0.318) (0.0344) (0.258) (0.0382) (0.0259) (0.00573) 
Size	+,$%&  0.183 1.198*** 0.306 -1.042*** -0.582 -1.514*** -2.425*** -2.355*** 0.0235 -0.0956
*** 
 (0.290) (0.0540) (0.400) (0.0674) (0.377) (0.0781) (0.263) (0.0865) (0.0183) (0.0124) 
ROA	+,$%&  0.206*** 0.407*** -0.0292 -0.201*** -0.135** -0.347*** 0.293*** 0.193*** 0.00857
** 0.00508*** 
 (0.0281) (0.0109) (0.0512) (0.0159) (0.0581) (0.0170) (0.0485) (0.0137) (0.00430) (0.00175) 
NPL	+,$%&  0.0554*** 0.0998*** -0.107*** -0.143*** -0.150*** -0.202*** -0.272*** -0.302*** -0.00321 0.000541 
 (0.0197) (0.00380) (0.0277) (0.00608) (0.0385) (0.00673) (0.0377) (0.00737) (0.00584) (0.000962) 
GDP	growth	$%&  0.192 0.173
*** 0.179 0.422*** 0.187 0.484*** -1.115*** -0.775*** -0.0353* -0.0976*** 
 (0.156) (0.0513) (0.251) (0.0928) (0.323) (0.0918) (0.266) (0.100) (0.0182) (0.0113) 
!&M+,$%&  0.784*** 1.354*** 2.938*** 3.268*** 2.235*** 3.695*** -15.19*** -12.89*** 0.0193 0.0200
*** 
 (0.100) (0.0371) (0.225) (0.0678) (0.257) (0.0782) (0.264) (0.0772) (0.0173) (0.00659) 
Banks fixed effect  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
time fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
w& + w8  -0.0289 0.544 0.766 -0.833 -0.707 -0.816 -0.175 -0.480 0.0652 0.0424 
Wald test p value 0.942 0.000 0.260 0.000 0.317 0.000 0.766 0.006 0.124 0.0972 
r2 0.107 0.242 0.119 0.0938 0.0840 0.137 0.627 0.538 0.427 0.527 
N 16711 240378 16484 239439 16484 239446 16711 240378 16397 228750 
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APPENDIX F 
Table 1F: Impact of market liquidity shortages in normal time according to bank liquidity level  
This table displays the impact of market liquidity shortages during normal time, on the change in total capital ratio (∆TCR), on the change in asset part of risk weighted assets (∆RWA), on the change in asset part of 
total loans (∆LOAN), on the change in total assets (∆ASSET) and on dividend to total assets ratio (DIVIDEND) according to whether or not the bank is more reliant on market liquidity.  MLSt-1 is a dummy variable 
that is equal to one if the TED spread is higher at time t-1, than its 75th percentile of normal time. Z!,t-1  is a dummy variable that is equal to one if bank i is more reliant on market liquidity (NSFR<100%) at time t-1 
or 0 otherwise. size is the natural logarithm of total assets. ROA is return on asset. NPL is non-performing loans over total loans. Dummy_gap is a dummy variable equals to one if the bank is operating below its 
target total capital ratio or 0 otherwise. GDP growth is the quarterly growth rate of GDP. M&A is a dummy variable for mergers and acquisitions. It is equal to one if the asset growth rate is lower than 10% during 
the quarter and zero otherwise. “large” corresponds to banks with total assets higher than $1 billion and “small” corresponds to banks with total assets lower or equal to $1 billion. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
*indicate statistical significance at the 10% level. **indicate statistical significance at the 5% level. ***indicate statistical significance at the 1% level. 
 ∆TCR ∆RWA ∆LOANS ∆ASSET DIVIDEND 
 LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL 
!"#$%& ((&) -0.365 0.224** 0.860 -0.307* -0.322 -0.340** 0.469 -0.463*** 0.0671 0.0510* 
 (0.600) (0.0971) (0.788) (0.156) (0.819) (0.151) (0.681) (0.173) (0.0519) (0.0262) 
*+,$%& ((-) 0.0657 0.0676*** -0.158 -0.160*** -0.512* -0.283*** 0.164 0.000200 -0.0106 0.00229 
 (0.204) (0.0146) (0.247) (0.0255) (0.277) (0.0262) (0.229) (0.0279) (0.0208) (0.00498) 
./001_345+,$%& ((6) 0.625*** 0.448*** -0.919*** -1.009*** -0.417** -0.529*** 0.423*** 0.199*** -0.0535*** -0.0164*** 
 (0.111) (0.0169) (0.144) (0.0339) (0.190) (0.0295) (0.146) (0.0310) (0.0161) (0.00499) 
*+,$%& ∗ !"#$%& ((8) 0.0837 0.0884*** -0.0129 -0.112*** -0.166 -0.0967** -0.333 0.145*** 0.00323 -0.00237 
 (0.138) (0.0232) (0.301) (0.0416) (0.372) (0.0378) (0.272) (0.0385) (0.0273) (0.00596) 
Size	+,$%&  0.198 0.956*** 0.161 -0.700*** -0.614* -1.092*** -2.245*** -2.269*** 0.0236 -0.0902*** 
 (0.292) (0.0579) (0.399) (0.0678) (0.370) (0.0763) (0.271) (0.0880) (0.0171) (0.0128) 
ROA	+,$%&  0.255*** 0.386*** -0.0479 -0.198*** -0.159** -0.323*** 0.318*** 0.197*** 0.0120** 0.00496** 
 (0.0527) (0.0139) (0.0659) (0.0195) (0.0786) (0.0205) (0.0652) (0.0159) (0.00603) (0.00220) 
NPL	+,$%&  0.0650** 0.0935*** -0.0926*** -0.130*** -0.149*** -0.178*** -0.253*** -0.301*** -0.00338 0.000861 
 (0.0269) (0.00437) (0.0299) (0.00672) (0.0399) (0.00727) (0.0451) (0.00804) (0.00701) (0.00111) 
GDP	growth	$%&  0.262 0.137** 0.0361 0.461*** 0.0905 0.508*** -1.178*** -0.812*** -0.0393** -0.0990*** 
 (0.306) (0.0545) (0.297) (0.0935) (0.373) (0.0917) (0.271) (0.0993) (0.0194) (0.0112) 
!&M+,$%&  0.992*** 1.311*** 2.707*** 3.221*** 1.959*** 3.615*** -15.22*** -13.02*** 0.0165 0.0182*** 
 (0.126) (0.0418) (0.231) (0.0713) (0.269) (0.0813) (0.291) (0.0856) (0.0172) (0.00673) 
Banks fixed effect  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
time fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
(& + (8  -0.281 0.312 0.847 -0.419 -0.489 -0.437 0.136 -0.318 0.0703 0.0486 
Wald test p value 0.628 0.002 0.241 0.008 0.509 0.004 0.825 0.064 0.0784 0.0567 
r2 0.0839 0.200 0.109 0.0939 0.0726 0.137 0.630 0.537 0.432 0.535 
N 14517 211756 14359 210999 14359 211006 14517 211756 14218 199976 
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Table 2F: Impact of market liquidity shortages in normal time according to gap between actual and target capital 
This table displays the impact of market liquidity shortages during normal time, on the change in total capital ratio (∆TCR), on the change in asset part of risk weighted assets (∆RWA), on the change in asset part of 
total loans (∆LOAN), on the change in total assets (∆ASSET) and on dividend to total assets ratio (DIVIDEND) according to whether or not the bank is operating below its target total capital ratio.  MLSt-1 is a 
dummy variable that is equal to one if the TED spread is higher at time t-1, than its 75th percentile of normal time. Z!,t-1  is a dummy variable that is equal to one if bank i is more reliant on market liquidity 
(NSFR<100%) at time t-1 or 0 otherwise. size is the natural logarithm of total assets. ROA is return on asset. NPL is non-performing loans over total loans. Dummy_gap is a dummy variable equals to one if the bank 
is operating below its target total capital ratio or 0 otherwise. GDP growth is the quarterly growth rate of GDP. M&A is a dummy variable for mergers and acquisitions. It is equal to one if the asset growth rate is 
lower than 10% during the quarter and zero otherwise. “large” corresponds to banks with total assets higher than $1 billion and “small” corresponds to banks with total assets lower or equal to $1 billion. Standard 
errors are in parentheses. *indicate statistical significance at the 10% level. **indicate statistical significance at the 5% level. ***indicate statistical significance at the 1% level. 
 ∆TCR ∆RWA ∆LOANS ∆ASSET DIVIDEND 
 LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL 
!"#$%& (w&) -0.415 0.237** 0.992 -0.308** -0.351 -0.386** 0.251 -0.360** 0.0771 0.0477* 
 (0.578) (0.0965) (0.733) (0.155) (0.760) (0.150) (0.623) (0.171) (0.0472) (0.0258) 
*+,$%& (w-) 0.0877 0.0924*** -0.159 -0.191*** -0.559** -0.311*** 0.0698 0.0428* -0.00957 0.00167 
 (0.177) (0.0140) (0.223) (0.0245) (0.263) (0.0244) (0.204) (0.0259) (0.0186) (0.00467) 
./001_345+,$%& (w6) 0.588*** 0.406*** -0.878*** -0.936*** -0.382** -0.522*** 0.449*** 0.232*** -0.0515*** -0.0182*** 
 (0.116) (0.0174) (0.150) (0.0340) (0.192) (0.0310) (0.152) (0.0325) (0.0171) (0.00521) 
./001_345+,$%& ∗ !"#$%& (w8) 0.166 0.164*** -0.192 -0.281*** -0.159 -0.0273 -0.106 -0.125*** -0.00976 0.00791 
 (0.157) (0.0191) (0.207) (0.0398) (0.317) (0.0350) (0.229) (0.0387) (0.0238) (0.00534) 
Size	+,$%&  0.201 0.960*** 0.157 -0.706*** -0.616* -1.093*** -2.244*** -2.271*** 0.0234 -0.0902*** 
 (0.293) (0.0579) (0.400) (0.0677) (0.371) (0.0764) (0.272) (0.0880) (0.0171) (0.0128) 
ROA	+,$%&  0.255*** 0.386*** -0.0471 -0.198*** -0.158** -0.323*** 0.319*** 0.197*** 0.0120** 0.00495** 
 (0.0526) (0.0138) (0.0657) (0.0195) (0.0786) (0.0205) (0.0651) (0.0159) (0.00608) (0.00220) 
NPL	+,$%&  0.0647** 0.0936*** -0.0924*** -0.130*** -0.149*** -0.177*** -0.252*** -0.303*** -0.00337 0.000906 
 (0.0269) (0.00436) (0.0299) (0.00671) (0.0397) (0.00727) (0.0452) (0.00804) (0.00702) (0.00111) 
GDP	growth	$%&  0.262 0.137** 0.0358 0.460*** 0.0906 0.508*** -1.178*** -0.812*** -0.0393** -0.0989*** 
 (0.306) (0.0545) (0.297) (0.0935) (0.373) (0.0917) (0.271) (0.0993) (0.0194) (0.0112) 
!&M+,$%&  0.991*** 1.310*** 2.709*** 3.223*** 1.960*** 3.615*** -15.22*** -13.02*** 0.0165 0.0181*** 
 (0.127) (0.0418) (0.231) (0.0712) (0.269) (0.0813) (0.291) (0.0856) (0.0172) (0.00673) 
Banks fixed effect  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
time fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
w& + w8  -0.249 0.401 0.800 -0.590 -0.511 -0.413 0.146 -0.485 0.0673 0.0556 
Wald test p value 0.672 0.000 0.271 0.000 0.495 0.007 0.816 0.005 0.0904 0.0308 
r2 0.0840 0.200 0.109 0.0941 0.0727 0.137 0.630 0.537 0.432 0.535 
N 14517 211756 14359 210999 14359 211006 14517 211756 14418 210430 
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Table 3F: Impact of severe market liquidity shortages (90th percentile) in normal time according to bank liquidity level 
This table displays the impact of market liquidity shortages during normal time on the change in total capital ratio (∆TCR), on the change in asset part of risk weighted assets (∆RWA), on the change in asset part of 
total loans (∆LOAN), on the change in total assets (∆ASSET) and on dividend to total assets ratio (DIVIDEND) according to whether or not the bank is more reliant on market liquidity.  MLSt-1 is a dummy variable 
that is equal to one if the TED spread is higher at time t-1, than its 90th percentile of normal time. Z!,t-1  is a dummy variable that is equal to one if bank i is more reliant on market liquidity (NSFR<100%) at time t-1 
or 0 otherwise. size is the natural logarithm of total assets. ROA is return on asset. NPL is non-performing loans over total loans. Dummy_gap is a dummy variable equals to one if the bank is operating below its 
target total capital ratio or 0 otherwise. GDP growth is the quarterly growth rate of GDP. M&A is a dummy variable for mergers and acquisitions. It is equal to one if the asset growth rate is lower than 10% during 
the quarter and zero otherwise. “large” corresponds to banks with total assets higher than $1 billion and “small” corresponds to banks with total assets lower or equal to $1 billion. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
*indicate statistical significance at the 10% level. **indicate statistical significance at the 5% level. ***indicate statistical significance at the 1% level. 
 ∆TCR ∆RWA ∆LOANS ∆ASSET DIVIDEND 
 LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL 
!"#$%& ((&) -0.294 0.192* 2.175** -0.290* 0.640 -0.323** 0.165 -0.436** 0.132 0.0624** 
 (0.613) (0.0982) (1.045) (0.160) (1.021) (0.152) (0.823) (0.174) (0.0892) (0.0270) 
*+,$%& ((-) 0.0896 0.0752*** -0.0518 -0.175*** -0.469* -0.295*** 0.0679 0.0307 -0.00555 0.00328 
 (0.180) (0.0143) (0.220) (0.0250) (0.267) (0.0251) (0.207) (0.0267) (0.0182) (0.00474) 
./001_345+,$%& ((6) 0.624*** 0.448*** -0.916*** -1.009*** -0.413** -0.529*** 0.426*** 0.199*** -0.0534*** -0.0164*** 
 (0.111) (0.0169) (0.143) (0.0339) (0.190) (0.0295) (0.146) (0.0310) (0.0161) (0.00499) 
*+,$%& ∗ !"#$%& ((8) 0.00365 0.157*** -1.505** -0.150** -1.260* -0.135** 0.00825 0.0998* -0.0701 -0.0256* 
 (0.166) (0.0380) (0.733) (0.0706) (0.718) (0.0527) (0.585) (0.0578) (0.0820) (0.0131) 
Size	+,$%&  0.197 0.957*** 0.153 -0.701*** -0.619* -1.093*** -2.242*** -2.268*** 0.0232 -0.0903*** 
 (0.293) (0.0579) (0.399) (0.0678) (0.370) (0.0763) (0.271) (0.0879) (0.0171) (0.0128) 
ROA	+,$%&  0.255*** 0.386*** -0.0502 -0.198*** -0.161** -0.323*** 0.319*** 0.197*** 0.0119** 0.00496** 
 (0.0527) (0.0139) (0.0660) (0.0195) (0.0786) (0.0205) (0.0652) (0.0159) (0.00596) (0.00220) 
NPL	+,$%&  0.0649** 0.0936*** -0.0943*** -0.130*** -0.150*** -0.177*** -0.252*** -0.302*** -0.00346 0.000807 
 (0.0269) (0.00437) (0.0298) (0.00672) (0.0397) (0.00726) (0.0452) (0.00804) (0.00700) (0.00111) 
GDP	growth	$%&  0.262 0.137** 0.0353 0.461*** 0.0901 0.508*** -1.178*** -0.812*** -0.0394** -0.0990*** 
 (0.306) (0.0545) (0.297) (0.0935) (0.373) (0.0917) (0.271) (0.0993) (0.0194) (0.0112) 
!&M+,$%&  0.993*** 1.311*** 2.717*** 3.221*** 1.967*** 3.615*** -15.22*** -13.02*** 0.0168 0.0183*** 
 (0.127) (0.0418) (0.230) (0.0713) (0.269) (0.0813) (0.291) (0.0856) (0.0172) (0.00673) 
Banks fixed effect  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
time fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
(& + (8  -0.290 0.349 0.671 -0.441 -0.619 -0.458 0.173 -0.336 0.0615 0.0368 
Wald test p value 0.617 0.000 0.349 0.005 0.400 0.003 0.779 0.053 0.121 0.156 
r2 0.0838 0.200 0.110 0.0939 0.0732 0.137 0.630 0.537 0.433 0.535 
N 14517 211756 14359 210999 14359 211006 14517 211756 14218 199976 
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Table 4F: Impact of severe market liquidity shortages (90th percentile) in normal time according to gap between actual and target capital  
This table displays the impact of market liquidity shortages during normal time, on the change in total capital ratio (∆TCR), on the change in asset part of risk weighted assets (∆RWA), on the change in asset part of 
total loans (∆LOAN), on the change in total assets (∆ASSET) and on dividend to total assets ratio (DIVIDEND) according to whether or not the bank is operating below its target total capital ratio. MLSt-1 is a dummy 
variable that is equal to one if the TED spread is higher at time t-1, than its 90th percentile of normal time. Z!,t-1  is a dummy variable that is equal to one if bank i is more reliant on market liquidity (NSFR<100%) at 
time t-1 or 0 otherwise. size is the natural logarithm of total assets. ROA is return on asset. NPL is non-performing loans over total loans. Dummy_gap is a dummy variable equals to one if the bank is operating 
below its target total capital ratio or 0 otherwise. GDP growth is the quarterly growth rate of GDP. M&A is a dummy variable for mergers and acquisitions. It is equal to one if the asset growth rate is lower than 10% 
during the quarter and zero otherwise. “large” corresponds to banks with total assets higher than $1 billion and “small” corresponds to banks with total assets lower or equal to $1 billion. Standard errors are in 
parentheses. *indicate statistical significance at the 10% level. **indicate statistical significance at the 5% level. ***indicate statistical significance at the 1% level. 
 ∆TCR ∆RWA ∆LOANS ∆ASSET DIVIDEND 
 LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL 
!"#$%& (w&) -0.588 0.213** 1.360* -0.270* -0.516 -0.363** 0.524 -0.381** 0.119* 0.0499* 
 (0.607) (0.0962) (0.752) (0.156) (0.827) (0.150) (0.702) (0.171) (0.0646) (0.0262) 
*+,$%& (w-) 0.0898 0.0928*** -0.162 -0.192*** -0.561** -0.311*** 0.0685 0.0422 -0.00960 0.00170 
 (0.176) (0.0140) (0.222) (0.0245) (0.264) (0.0244) (0.204) (0.0259) (0.0186) (0.00467) 
./001_345+,$%& (w6) 0.594*** 0.417*** -0.866*** -0.958*** -0.421** -0.513*** 0.462*** 0.202*** -0.0490*** -0.0164*** 
 (0.114) (0.0175) (0.154) (0.0339) (0.182) (0.0302) (0.151) (0.0317) (0.0164) (0.00506) 
./001_345+,$%& ∗ !"#$%& (w8) 0.394 0.334*** -0.678 -0.560*** 0.0608 -0.167*** -0.466 -0.0279 -0.0656 -0.000446 
 (0.433) (0.0337) (0.615) (0.0726) (0.680) (0.0528) (0.431) (0.0629) (0.0525) (0.0127) 
Size	+,$%&  0.202 0.969*** 0.152 -0.721*** -0.612 -1.098*** -2.248*** -2.269*** 0.0230 -0.0902*** 
 (0.294) (0.0584) (0.401) (0.0682) (0.373) (0.0767) (0.271) (0.0883) (0.0171) (0.0129) 
ROA	+,$%&  0.255*** 0.387*** -0.0481 -0.198*** -0.159** -0.323*** 0.319*** 0.197*** 0.0120** 0.00496** 
 (0.0527) (0.0139) (0.0658) (0.0195) (0.0786) (0.0205) (0.0651) (0.0159) (0.00603) (0.00220) 
NPL	+,$%&  0.0653** 0.0938*** -0.0933*** -0.130*** -0.149*** -0.177*** -0.253*** -0.302*** -0.00340 0.000875 
 (0.0269) (0.00437) (0.0300) (0.00672) (0.0397) (0.00727) (0.0452) (0.00804) (0.00701) (0.00111) 
GDP	growth	$%&  0.262 0.137** 0.0359 0.460*** 0.0909 0.508*** -1.178*** -0.812*** -0.0394** -0.0990*** 
 (0.306) (0.0545) (0.297) (0.0935) (0.373) (0.0917) (0.271) (0.0993) (0.0194) (0.0112) 
!&M+,$%&  0.994*** 1.309*** 2.705*** 3.224*** 1.959*** 3.615*** -15.23*** -13.02*** 0.0161 0.0182*** 
 (0.127) (0.0418) (0.231) (0.0713) (0.269) (0.0813) (0.291) (0.0856) (0.0172) (0.00674) 
Banks fixed effect  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
time fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
w& + w8  -0.194 0.548 0.682 -0.829 -0.456 -0.530 0.0583 -0.409 0.0531 0.0494 
Wald test p value 0.751 0.000 0.379 0.000 0.561 0.001 0.926 0.024 0.166 0.0610 
r2 0.0841 0.201 0.109 0.0942 0.0726 0.137 0.630 0.537 0.433 0.535 
N 14517 211756 14359 210999 14359 211006 14517 211756 14218 199976 
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Table 5F: Impact of severe market liquidity shortages (mean plus two times standard deviation) in normal time according to bank liquidity level  
This table displays the impact of market liquidity shortages during normal time on the change in total capital ratio (∆TCR), on the change in asset part of risk weighted assets (∆RWA), on the change in asset part of 
total loans (∆LOAN), on the change in total assets (∆ASSET) and on dividend to total assets ratio (DIVIDEND) according to whether or not the bank is more reliant on market liquidity.  MLSt-1 is a dummy variable 
that is equal to one if the TED spread is higher at time t-1, than its mean plus two times its standard deviation of normal time. Z!,t-1  is a dummy variable that is equal to one if bank i is more reliant on market liquidity 
(NSFR<100%) at time t-1 or 0 otherwise. size is the natural logarithm of total assets. ROA is return on asset. NPL is non-performing loans over total loans. Dummy_gap is a dummy variable equals to one if the bank 
is operating below its target total capital ratio or 0 otherwise. GDP growth is the quarterly growth rate of GDP. M&A is a dummy variable for mergers and acquisitions. It is equal to one if the asset growth rate is 
lower than 10% during the quarter and zero otherwise. “large” corresponds to banks with total assets higher than $1 billion and “small” corresponds to banks with total assets lower or equal to $1 billion. Standard 
errors are in parentheses. *indicate statistical significance at the 10% level. **indicate statistical significance at the 5% level. ***indicate statistical significance at the 1% level. 
 ∆TCR ∆RWA ∆LOANS ∆ASSET DIVIDEND 
 LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL 
!"#$%& ((&) 0.436 0.804*** 1.907** -0.594*** -0.0576 -1.202*** -3.669*** -2.092*** 0.0526 -0.120*** 
 (0.505) (0.0803) (0.904) (0.145) (0.884) (0.109) (0.939) (0.119) (0.0971) (0.0194) 
*+,$%& ((-) 0.0896 0.0842*** -0.0827 -0.190*** -0.500* -0.314*** 0.0648 0.0407 -0.00802 0.00287 
 (0.178) (0.0142) (0.228) (0.0248) (0.271) (0.0250) (0.204) (0.0265) (0.0181) (0.00473) 
./001_345+,$%& ((6) 0.624*** 0.448*** -0.920*** -1.009*** -0.417** -0.529*** 0.426*** 0.200*** -0.0536*** -0.0164*** 
 (0.111) (0.0169) (0.144) (0.0339) (0.190) (0.0295) (0.146) (0.0310) (0.0161) (0.00499) 
*+,$%& ∗ !"#$%& ((8) 0.00494 0.105** -1.578** -0.0231 -1.215* 0.0383 0.0747 0.0177 -0.0404 -0.0228* 
 (0.191) (0.0427) (0.756) (0.0845) (0.735) (0.0586) (0.806) (0.0641) (0.0876) (0.0133) 
Size	+,$%&  0.197 0.957*** 0.152 -0.701*** -0.620* -1.092*** -2.242*** -2.268*** 0.0234 -0.0903*** 
 (0.293) (0.0579) (0.399) (0.0678) (0.370) (0.0763) (0.271) (0.0879) (0.0171) (0.0128) 
ROA	+,$%&  0.255*** 0.387*** -0.0491 -0.198*** -0.160** -0.323*** 0.319*** 0.197*** 0.0120** 0.00496** 
 (0.0527) (0.0139) (0.0660) (0.0195) (0.0786) (0.0205) (0.0652) (0.0159) (0.00600) (0.00220) 
NPL	+,$%&  0.0649** 0.0932*** -0.0936*** -0.129*** -0.150*** -0.177*** -0.252*** -0.302*** -0.00341 0.000827 
 (0.0269) (0.00437) (0.0299) (0.00672) (0.0398) (0.00727) (0.0452) (0.00804) (0.00700) (0.00111) 
GDP	growth	$%&  0.112 0.277*** 0.473* 0.271*** -0.155 0.305*** -1.088*** -1.012*** -0.00323 -0.0732*** 
 (0.216) (0.0335) (0.282) (0.0507) (0.270) (0.0511) (0.233) (0.0543) (0.0216) (0.0109) 
!&M+,$%&  0.993*** 1.311*** 2.714*** 3.220*** 1.964*** 3.614*** -15.22*** -13.02*** 0.0166 0.0182*** 
 (0.127) (0.0418) (0.230) (0.0713) (0.269) (0.0813) (0.291) (0.0856) (0.0172) (0.00673) 
Banks fixed effect  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
time fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
(& + (8  0.441 0.909 0.329 -0.617 -1.273 -1.163 -3.595 -2.074 0.0122 -0.143 
Wald test p value 0.300 0.000 0.559 0.000 0.0263 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.770 0.000 
r2 0.0838 0.200 0.110 0.0939 0.0730 0.137 0.630 0.537 0.433 0.535 
N 14517 211756 14359 210999 14359 211006 14517 211756 14218 199976 
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Table 6F: Impact of market liquidity shortages (mean plus two times standard deviation) in normal time according to gap between actual and target capital  
This table displays the impact of market liquidity shortages during normal time, on the change in total capital ratio (∆TCR), on the change in asset part of risk weighted assets (∆RWA), on the change in asset part of 
total loans (∆LOAN), on the change in total assets (∆ASSET) and on dividend to total assets ratio (DIVIDEND) according to whether or not the bank is operating below its target total capital ratio.  MLSt-1 is a 
dummy variable that is equal to one if the TED spread is higher at time t-1, than its mean plus two times its standard deviation of normal time. Z!,t-1  is a dummy variable that is equal to one if bank i is more reliant 
on market liquidity (NSFR<100%) at time t-1 or 0 otherwise. size is the natural logarithm of total assets. ROA is return on asset. NPL is non-performing loans over total loans. Dummy_gap is a dummy variable 
equals to one if the bank is operating below its target total capital ratio or 0 otherwise. GDP growth is the quarterly growth rate of GDP. M&A is a dummy variable for mergers and acquisitions. It is equal to one if 
the asset growth rate is lower than 10% during the quarter and zero otherwise. “large” corresponds to banks with total assets higher than $1 billion and “small” corresponds to banks with total assets lower or equal 
to $1 billion. Standard errors are in parentheses. *indicate statistical significance at the 10% level. **indicate statistical significance at the 5% level. ***indicate statistical significance at the 1% level. 
 ∆TCR ∆RWA ∆LOANS ∆ASSET DIVIDEND 
 LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL 
!"#$%& (w&) 0.158 0.776*** 0.743 -0.456*** -1.673* -1.168*** -3.087*** -2.022*** 0.0346 -0.134*** 
 (0.518) (0.0759) (0.609) (0.139) (0.879) (0.105) (0.707) (0.115) (0.0669) (0.0180) 
*+,$%& (w-) 0.0909 0.0928*** -0.163 -0.192*** -0.559** -0.311*** 0.0665 0.0425 -0.00975 0.00170 
 (0.175) (0.0140) (0.222) (0.0245) (0.264) (0.0244) (0.204) (0.0259) (0.0187) (0.00467) 
./001_345+,$%& (w6) 0.607*** 0.428*** -0.905*** -0.973*** -0.450** -0.526*** 0.458*** 0.214*** -0.0526*** -0.0167*** 
 (0.111) (0.0174) (0.155) (0.0337) (0.181) (0.0300) (0.149) (0.0315) (0.0163) (0.00504) 
./001_345+,$%& ∗ !"#$%& (w8) 0.348 0.280*** -0.282 -0.501*** 0.671 -0.0439 -0.637 -0.199*** -0.0216 0.00533 
 (0.553) (0.0351) (0.732) (0.0812) (0.888) (0.0572) (0.540) (0.0659) (0.0527) (0.0128) 
Size	+,$%&  0.200 0.965*** 0.158 -0.715*** -0.607 -1.093*** -2.248*** -2.274*** 0.0235 -0.0901*** 
 (0.294) (0.0582) (0.402) (0.0680) (0.374) (0.0765) (0.271) (0.0883) (0.0171) (0.0129) 
ROA	+,$%&  0.256*** 0.387*** -0.0481 -0.198*** -0.158** -0.323*** 0.318*** 0.197*** 0.0120** 0.00496** 
 (0.0527) (0.0139) (0.0660) (0.0195) (0.0784) (0.0205) (0.0651) (0.0159) (0.00604) (0.00220) 
NPL	+,$%&  0.0652** 0.0935*** -0.0928*** -0.130*** -0.148*** -0.177*** -0.253*** -0.302*** -0.00339 0.000882 
 (0.0269) (0.00437) (0.0300) (0.00672) (0.0397) (0.00726) (0.0452) (0.00804) (0.00701) (0.00111) 
GDP	growth	$%&  0.115 0.281*** 0.473* 0.264*** -0.146 0.305*** -1.095*** -1.015*** -0.00334 -0.0731*** 
 (0.217) (0.0336) (0.286) (0.0508) (0.274) (0.0512) (0.233) (0.0544) (0.0215) (0.0109) 
!&M+,$%&  0.994*** 1.310*** 2.706*** 3.224*** 1.961*** 3.615*** -15.23*** -13.02*** 0.0164 0.0182*** 
 (0.127) (0.0418) (0.231) (0.0713) (0.270) (0.0813) (0.291) (0.0857) (0.0173) (0.00674) 
Banks fixed effect  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
time fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
w& + w8  0.506 1.057 0.461 -0.957 -1.002 -1.212 -3.724 -2.221 0.0130 -0.128 
Wald test p value 0.284 0.000 0.470 0.000 0.100 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.758 0.000 
r2 0.0840 0.200 0.109 0.0941 0.0728 0.137 0.630 0.537 0.432 0.535 
N 14517 211756 14359 210999 14359 211006 14517 211756 14218 199976 
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APPENDIX G:  
TABLE 1G: Impact of market liquidity shortages on the change in large banks’ total capital 
ratio (∆TCR) according to their liquidity level 
This table displays the impact of market liquidity shortages on the change in total capital ratio (∆TCR) of large banks according 
to whether or not they are more reliant on market liquidity and the level of risk management. We compare each bank’s futures 
contracts committing to purchase or sell equity securities and each bank’s swap notional value to the respective medians of 
both variables (both medians equal 0). We consider that banks have a better risk management if their amount of futures contracts 
committing them to purchase or sell equity securities is higher than the median and banks have a poor risk management if their 
amount of futures contracts committing them to purchase or sell equity securities is equal to the median; or banks are also said 
to have a better risk management if their swap notional value is higher than the median and banks have a poor risk management 
if their swap national value is equal to the median. MLSt-1 is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the TED spread is higher 
than its 75th percentile at time t-1. Z!,t-1  is a dummy variable that is equal to one if bank i is more reliant on market liquidity at 
time t-1 or 0 otherwise. size is the natural logarithm of total assets. ROA is return on asset. NPL is non-performing loans over 
total loans. Dummy_gap is a dummy variable equals to one if the bank is operating below its target total capital ratio or 0 
otherwise. GDP growth is the quarterly growth rate of GDP. M&A is a dummy variable for mergers and acquisitions. It is 
equal to one if the asset growth rate is lower than 10% during the quarter and zero otherwise. large banks are banks with total 
assets higher than $1 billion. Standard errors are in parentheses. *indicate statistical significance at the 10% level. **indicate 
statistical significance at the 5% level. ***indicate statistical significance at the 1% level. 
 
 
 Futures contracts committing to purchase or sell equity securities swap national value 
 Better risk 
management 
poor risk 
management 
Better risk 
management 
poor risk 
management 
!"#$%& ((&) 2.540 -0.605 -1.895 -0.00229  (1.866) (0.589) (1.457) (0.589) 
*+,$%& ((-) 2.078 0.0788 0.503 0.0271  (1.320) (0.169) (0.397) (0.171) 
./001_345+,$%& ((6) 2.387** 0.575*** 0.720*** 0.600***  (0.967) (0.0963) (0.235) (0.107) 
*+,$%& ∗ !"#$%& ((8) 0 0.168 0.273 0.128  (.) (0.148) (0.479) (0.153) 
Size	+,$%&  2.064 0.0991 0.0359 0.210 
 (1.240) (0.280) (0.237) (0.407) 
ROA	+,$%&  0.286 0.224*** 0.317*** 0.207*** 
 (0.245) (0.0367) (0.0728) (0.0426) 
NPL	+,$%&  0.0839 0.0554** 0.0741** 0.0486*  (0.103) (0.0218) (0.0319) (0.0259) 
GDP	growth	$%&  -0.0406 0.284 1.109 -0.0380  (0.235) (0.315) (1.071) (0.137) 
!&M+,$%&  0.421 0.903*** 0.864*** 0.889***  (0.307) (0.114) (0.175) (0.131) 
Banks fixed effect  yes yes yes yes 
time fixed effect yes yes yes yes 
(& + (8  2.540 -0.436 -1.622 0.126 
Wald test p value 0.222 0.450 0.316 0.806 
r2 0.387 0.0758 0.104 0.0853 
N 205 17077 3695 13587 
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TABLE 2G: Impact of market liquidity shortages on the change in large banks’ total capital 
ratio (∆TCR) according to gap between actual and target capital 
This table displays the impact of market liquidity shortages on the change in total capital ratio (∆TCR) of large banks according 
to gap between actual and target capital and the level of risk management. We compare each bank’s futures contracts 
committing to purchase or sell equity securities and each bank’s swap notional value to the respective medians of both variables 
(both medians equal 0). We consider that banks have a better risk management if their amount of futures contracts committing 
them to purchase or sell equity securities is higher than the median and banks have a poor risk management if their amount of 
futures contracts committing them to purchase or sell equity securities is equal to the median; or banks are also said to have a 
better risk management if their swap notional value is higher than the median and banks  have a poor risk management if their 
swap national value is equal to the median. MLSt-1 is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the TED spread is higher than its 
75th percentile at time t-1. Z!,t-1  is a dummy variable that is equal to one if bank i is more reliant on market liquidity at time t-
1 or 0 otherwise. size is the natural logarithm of total assets. ROA is return on asset. NPL is non-performing loans over total 
loans. Dummy_gap is a dummy variable equals to one if the bank is operating below its target total capital ratio or 0 otherwise. 
GDP growth is the quarterly growth rate of GDP. M&A is a dummy variable for mergers and acquisitions. It is equal to one if 
the asset growth rate is lower than 10% during the quarter and zero otherwise. large banks are banks with total assets higher 
than $1 billion. Standard errors are in parentheses. *indicate statistical significance at the 10% level. **indicate statistical 
significance at the 5% level. ***indicate statistical significance at the 1% level. 
 
 Futures contracts committing to purchase or sell equity securities swap national value 
 Better risk 
management 
poor risk 
management 
Better risk 
management 
poor risk 
management 
!"#$%& (w&) 8.503* -0.669 -1.592 -0.120  (3.606) (0.580) (1.632) (0.512) 
*+,$%& (w-) 1.690 0.112 0.544 0.0530  (1.071) (0.160) (0.380) (0.152) 
./001_345+,$%& (w6) 2.776** 0.512*** 0.736*** 0.526***  (0.992) (0.106) (0.271) (0.117) 
./001_345+,$%& 	∗ !"#$%& 
(w8) 
-5.142** 0.280* -0.0648 0.315* 
 (1.587) (0.157) (0.360) (0.174) 
Size	+,$%&  2.431 0.1000 0.0288 0.211 
 (1.534) (0.281) (0.237) (0.408) 
ROA	+,$%&  0.178 0.223*** 0.317*** 0.207*** 
 (0.165) (0.0365) (0.0725) (0.0423) 
NPL	+,$%&  0.228 0.0547** 0.0743** 0.0480*  (0.157) (0.0218) (0.0314) (0.0258) 
GDP	growth	$%&  -0.0716 0.284 1.108 -0.0371  (0.310) (0.315) (1.071) (0.137) 
!&M+,$%&  0.389 0.904*** 0.868*** 0.889***  (0.325) (0.114) (0.178) (0.131) 
Banks fixed effect  yes yes yes yes 
time fixed effect yes yes yes yes 
(& + (8  3.361 -0.390 -1.657 0.195 
Wald test p value 0.203 0.503 0.299 0.714 
r2 0.408 0.0762 0.104 0.0859 
N 205 17077 3695 13587 
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APPENDIX H:  
TABLE 1H: Impact of market liquidity shortages on the change in banks’ Tier one capital ratio (using alternative liquidity measures and different samples) 
This table displays the impact of market liquidity shortages on the change in Tier one capital ratio depending on whether or not the bank is more reliant on market liquidity.  “real commercial banks” are banks with 
total deposits to total assets ratio and total loans over total assets higher than 30%. MLSt-1 is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the TED spread is higher than its 75th percentile at time t-1. Z!,t-1  is a dummy 
variable that is equal to one if bank i is more reliant on market liquidity (either NSFR<100%, reliance on wholesale funding is higher than its 75th percentile, loans to core deposits ratio is lower higher 100% or liquid 
assets to total assets ratio is lower than its 25th percentile) at time t-1 or 0 otherwise. Dummy_gap is a dummy variable equals to one if the bank is operating below its target total capital ratio or 0 otherwise. size is 
the natural logarithm of total assets. ROA is return on asset. NPL is non-performing loans over total loans. GDP growth is the quarterly growth rate of GDP. M&A is a dummy variable for mergers and acquisitions. 
It is equal to one if the asset growth rate is lower than 10% during the quarter and zero otherwise. “large” corresponds to banks with total assets higher than $1 billion and “small” corresponds to banks with total 
assets lower or equal to $1 billion. Standard errors are in parentheses. *indicate statistical significance at the 10% level. **indicate statistical significance at the 5% level. ***indicate statistical significance at the 1% 
level.  
 
NSFR (“real commercial bank”) NSFR (whole 
sample) 
RESILANCE ON 
WHOLESALE FUNDING 
LOANS TO CORE 
DEPOSIT RATIO 
LIQUID ASSETS TO TOTAL 
ASSETS RATIO 
 LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL 
!"#$%& ((&) -0.241 0.301
*** -0.663 0.221** -0.482 0.298*** -0.726 0.266*** -0.546 0.272*** 
 (0.434) (0.0918) (0.553) (0.0960) (0.547) (0.0946) (0.514) (0.0934) (0.538) (0.0947) 
*+,$%& ((-) 0.0513 0.0740*** 0.0766 0.0772*** -0.0269 0.0239 0.116 0.204*** 0.0553 0.0924*** 
 (0.146) (0.0132) (0.160) (0.0134) (0.0626) (0.0200) (0.0839) (0.0225) (0.0399) (0.0137) 
./001_345+,$%& ((6) 0.579*** 0.377*** 0.548*** 0.399*** 0.542*** 0.399*** 0.504*** 0.389*** 0.540*** 0.384*** 
 (0.0889) (0.0147) (0.0922) (0.0151) (0.0921) (0.0152) (0.0907) (0.0150) (0.0929) (0.0151) 
*+,$%& ∗ !"#$%& ((8) 0.0828 0.163*** 0.184 0.164*** -0.00132 0.0878*** -0.00725 0.0303 0.133** 0.153*** 
 (0.159) (0.0229) (0.151) (0.0238) (0.0535) (0.0235) (0.0718) (0.0253) (0.0588) (0.0195) 
Size	+,$%&  0.150 1.142*** 0.0612 1.011*** 0.0758 1.022*** -0.0777 0.995*** 0.0634 1.013*** 
 (0.277) (0.0522) (0.263) (0.0534) (0.267) (0.0542) (0.237) (0.0533) (0.264) (0.0535) 
ROA	+,$%&  0.217*** 0.410*** 0.232*** 0.381*** 0.234*** 0.383*** 0.231*** 0.383*** 0.234*** 0.382*** 
 (0.0272) (0.0106) (0.0339) (0.0112) (0.0340) (0.0113) (0.0341) (0.0113) (0.0336) (0.0112) 
NPL	+,$%&  0.0577*** 0.0988*** 0.0559*** 0.0905*** 0.0564*** 0.0962*** 0.0562*** 0.0982*** 0.0584*** 0.0967*** 
 (0.0185) (0.00372) (0.0199) (0.00375) (0.0202) (0.00369) (0.0208) (0.00371) (0.0202) (0.00368) 
GDP	growth	$%&  0.203 0.170*** 0.280 0.135** 0.281 0.135** 0.283 0.135** 0.281 0.138** 
 (0.147) (0.0508) (0.292) (0.0540) (0.292) (0.0539) (0.294) (0.0540) (0.292) (0.0539) 
!&M+,$%&  0.772*** 1.327*** 0.883*** 1.376*** 0.881*** 1.378*** 0.802*** 1.388*** 0.888*** 1.388*** 
 (0.101) (0.0365) (0.111) (0.0384) (0.112) (0.0385) (0.103) (0.0386) (0.111) (0.0385) 
Banks fixed effect  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
time fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
(& + (8  -0.158 0.464 -0.479 0.385 -0.483 0.386 -0.733 0.296 -0.413 0.425 
Wald test p value 0.669 0.000 0.373 0.000 0.359 0.000 0.156 0.002 0.441 0.000 
r2 0.109 0.244 0.0800 0.211 0.0803 0.211 0.0803 0.215 0.0802 0.211 
N 16711 240376 17406 249446 17179 248469 17047 248255 17406 249441 
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TABLE 2H: Impact of market liquidity shortages on the change in banks’ Tier one capital ratio (using alternative thresholds and different periods) 
This table displays the impact of market liquidity shortages on the change in Tier one capital ratio depending on whether or not the bank is more reliant on market liquidity. In the first two columns, MLSt-1 is a 
dummy variable that is equal to one if the TED spread is higher than its 90th percentile at time t-1 or zero otherwise; Z!,t-1  is a dummy variable that is equal to one if bank i is more reliant on market liquidity 
(NSFR<100%)  at time t-1 or 0 otherwise. In the columns 3 &4, MLSt-1 is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the TED spread is higher at time t-1, than its 75th percentile at time t-1 or zero otherwise; Z!,t-1  is a 
dummy variable that is equal to one if bank i is more reliant on market liquidity  at time t-1 or 0 otherwise. We consider that banks have low liquidity level if its NSFR is lower than the 10th percentile of this variable. 
In the columns 5 & 6, MLSt-1 is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the TED spread is higher at time t-1, than its mean plus two times its standard deviation at time t-1 or zero otherwise; Z!,t-1  is a dummy variable 
that is equal to one if bank i is more reliant on market liquidity  (NSFR<100%) at time t-1 or 0 otherwise. In the columns 7 & 8 we focus on normal period, MLSt-1 is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the TED 
spread is higher at time t-1, than its 75th percentile or zero otherwise; Z!,t-1  is a dummy variable that is equal to one if bank i is more reliant on market liquidity (NSFR<100%) at time t-1 or 0 otherwise. size is the 
natural logarithm of total assets. ROA is return on asset. NPL is non-performing loans over total loans. Dummy_gap is a dummy variable equals to one if the bank is operating below its target total capital ratio or 0 
otherwise. GDP growth is the quarterly growth rate of GDP. M&A is a dummy variable for mergers and acquisitions. It is equal to one if the asset growth rate is lower than 10% during the quarter and zero otherwise. 
“large” corresponds to banks with total assets higher than $1 billion and “small” corresponds to banks with total assets lower or equal to $1 billion. Standard errors are in parentheses. *indicate statistical significance 
at the 10% level. **indicate statistical significance at the 5% level. ***indicate statistical significance at the 1% level. 
 90th percentile & NSFR<100% 75th percentile &NSFR<p10 
mean plus two times standard deviation 
&NSFR<100% 
75th percentile &NSFR<100 (normal 
time) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL 
!"#$%& ((&) 0.0823 0.890
*** -0.580 0.283*** -0.0259 0.889*** -0.450 0.193** 
 (0.576) (0.0956) (0.552) (0.0949) (0.659) (0.101) (0.572) (0.0958) 
*+,$%& ((-) 0.0927 0.105*** -0.0597 0.0197 0.101 0.112*** 0.0463 0.0759*** 
 (0.152) (0.0130) (0.0725) (0.0130) (0.148) (0.0127) (0.195) (0.0142) 
./001_345+,$%& ((6) 0.549*** 0.399*** 0.550
*** 0.400*** 0.549*** 0.399*** 0.567*** 0.431*** 
 (0.0923) (0.0151) (0.0920) (0.0151) (0.0924) (0.0151) (0.106) (0.0165) 
*+,$%& ∗ !"#$%& ((8) 0.296 0.146*** 0.128 0.111*** 0.407 0.149*** 0.0690 0.0834*** 
 (0.265) (0.0375) (0.0834) (0.0187) (0.449) (0.0519) (0.131) (0.0226) 
Size	+,$%&  0.0599 1.014*** 0.0679 1.023
*** 0.0596 1.015*** 0.147 0.917*** 
 (0.264) (0.0535) (0.263) (0.0537) (0.264) (0.0535) (0.281) (0.0563) 
ROA	+,$%&  0.232*** 0.381*** 0.234
*** 0.382*** 0.232*** 0.381*** 0.261*** 0.386*** 
 (0.0339) (0.0112) (0.0338) (0.0112) (0.0339) (0.0112) (0.0497) (0.0136) 
NPL	+,$%&  0.0558*** 0.0898*** 0.0581
*** 0.0931*** 0.0558*** 0.0895*** 0.0665*** 0.0912*** 
 (0.0199) (0.00375) (0.0201) (0.00384) (0.0199) (0.00375) (0.0254) (0.00427) 
GDP	growth	$%&  0.0206 0.295*** 0.281 0.135
** 0.0207 0.296*** 0.276 0.135** 
 (0.194) (0.0322) (0.293) (0.0539) (0.194) (0.0322) (0.292) (0.0541) 
!&M+,$%&  0.885*** 1.376*** 0.885
*** 1.379*** 0.884*** 1.377*** 0.971*** 1.281*** 
 (0.111) (0.0384) (0.111) (0.0384) (0.111) (0.0384) (0.125) (0.0409) 
Banks fixed effect  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
time fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
(& + (8  0.378 1.036 -0.452 0.394 0.382 1.038 -0.381 0.277 
Wald test p value 0.439 0.000 0.396 0.000 0.435 0.000 0.491 0.005 
r2 0.0800 0.211 0.0799 0.211 0.0800 0.211 0.0859 0.201 
N 17406 249446 17406 249446 17406 249446 14515 211746 
. 
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TABLE 3H: Impact of market liquidity shortages on the change in Tier 1 capital ratio according to gap between actual and target Tier 1 capital 
This table displays the impact of market liquidity shortages on the change in Tier 1 capital ratio according to whether or not the bank is operating below its target Tier 1 capital ratio.  MLSt-1 is a dummy variable that 
is equal to one if the TED spread is higher than either its 75th percentile, 90th percentile or its mean plus two times its standard deviation at time t-1. Z!,t-1  is a dummy variable that is equal to one if bank i is more 
reliant on market liquidity (NSFR<100%) at time t-1 or 0 otherwise. size is the natural logarithm of total assets. ROA is return on asset. NPL is non-performing loans over total loans. Dummy_gap_one is a dummy 
variable equals to one if the bank is operating below its target Tier one capital ratio (OMP_QRST+,$%& > 0) or 0 otherwise. GDP growth is the quarterly growth rate of GDP. M&A is a dummy variable for mergers and 
acquisitions. It is equal to one if the asset growth rate is lower than 10% during the quarter and zero otherwise. “large” corresponds to banks with total assets higher than $1 billion and “small” corresponds to banks 
with total assets lower or equal to $1 billion. Standard errors are in parentheses. *indicate statistical significance at the 10% level. **indicate statistical significance at the 5% level. ***indicate statistical significance 
at the 1% level. 
 75th percentile 90th percentile 
Mean plus two times standard 
deviation 
 LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL 
!"#$%& (w&) -0.689 0.270
*** 0.0230 0.988*** 0.147 1.015*** 
 (0.572) (0.0950) (0.548) (0.0903) (0.548) (0.0911) 
*+,$%& (w-) 0.112 0.114
*** 0.112 0.115*** 0.114 0.115*** 
 (0.152) (0.0125) (0.151) (0.0125) (0.151) (0.0125) 
./001_345_WXY+,$%& (w6) 0.544
*** 0.416*** 0.552*** 0.439*** 0.574*** 0.444*** 
 (0.123) (0.0172) (0.116) (0.0168) (0.116) (0.0167) 
./001_345_WXY+,$%& ∗ !"#$%& (w8) 0.229 0.123*** 0.404* 0.0421 0.256 -0.0196 
 (0.202) (0.0182) (0.212) (0.0262) (0.257) (0.0324) 
Size	+,$%&  0.0546 0.995
*** 0.0525 0.998*** 0.0547 1.001*** 
 (0.265) (0.0536) (0.266) (0.0538) (0.265) (0.0537) 
ROA	+,$%&  0.232
*** 0.380*** 0.232*** 0.380*** 0.232*** 0.380*** 
 (0.0340) (0.0112) (0.0340) (0.0112) (0.0341) (0.0112) 
NPL	+,$%&  0.0550
*** 0.0894*** 0.0548*** 0.0890*** 0.0550*** 0.0890*** 
 (0.0201) (0.00374) (0.0200) (0.00374) (0.0201) (0.00374) 
GDP	growth	$%&  0.279 0.138
** 0.0160 0.296*** 0.0179 0.297*** 
 (0.292) (0.0539) (0.197) (0.0322) (0.196) (0.0322) 
!&M+,$%&  0.883
*** 1.371*** 0.885*** 1.372*** 0.884*** 1.372*** 
 (0.111) (0.0383) (0.111) (0.0383) (0.111) (0.0383) 
Banks fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes 
time fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes 
w& + w8  -0.460 0.393 0.427 1.030 0.403 0.995 
Wald test p value 0.392 0.000 0.383 0.000 0.412 0.000 
r2 0.0799 0.212 0.0801 0.212 0.0798 0.212 
N 17406 249446 17406 249446 17406 249446 
 
 57 
APPENDIX I 
 
TABLE 1I: Impact of market liquidity shortages according to bank liquidity level using the commercial paper spread 
This table displays the impact of market liquidity shortages on the change in total capital ratio (∆TCR), on the change in asset part of risk weighted assets (∆RWA), on the change in asset part of total loans (∆LOAN), 
on the change in total assets (∆ASSET) and on dividend to total assets ratio (DIVIDEND) according to whether or not the bank is more reliant on market liquidity.  MLSt-1 is a dummy variable that is equal to one if 
the commercial paper spread is higher than its 75th percentile at time t-1. Z!,t-1  is a dummy variable that is equal to one if bank i is more reliant on market liquidity (NSFR<100%) at time t-1 or 0 otherwise. size is the 
natural logarithm of total assets. ROA is return on asset. NPL is non-performing loans over total loans. Dummy_gap is a dummy variable equals to one if the bank is operating below its target total capital ratio 
(OMP+,$%& > 0) or 0 otherwise. GDP growth is the quarterly growth rate of GDP. M&A is a dummy variable for mergers and acquisitions. It is equal to one if the asset growth rate is lower than 10% during the quarter 
and zero otherwise. “large” corresponds to banks with total assets higher than $1 billion and “small” corresponds to banks with total assets lower or equal to $1 billion. Standard errors are in parentheses. *indicate 
statistical significance at the 10% level. **indicate statistical significance at the 5% level. ***indicate statistical significance at the 1% level. 
 ∆TCR ∆RWA ∆LOAN ∆ASSET DIVIDEND 
 LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL 
!"#$%& ((&) -0.451 0.271*** 1.156 -0.429*** -0.374 -0.463*** 0.157 -0.456*** 0.0612 0.0521
** 
 (0.576) (0.0971) (0.763) (0.157) (0.783) (0.152) (0.667) (0.172) (0.0532) (0.0260) 
*+,$%& ((-) 0.129 0.0671*** -0.209 -0.136*** -0.592** -0.266*** 0.0817 0.00569 -0.000713 0.00648 
 (0.177) (0.0139) (0.227) (0.0241) (0.269) (0.0246) (0.214) (0.0258) (0.0222) (0.00463) 
./001_345+,$%& ((6) 0.598*** 0.414*** -0.862*** -0.931*** -0.380** -0.475*** 0.456*** 0.193*** -0.0502
*** -0.0144*** 
 (0.0966) (0.0154) (0.129) (0.0308) (0.168) (0.0276) (0.139) (0.0290) (0.0127) (0.00448) 
*+,$%& ∗ !"#$%& ((8) 0.0482 0.158*** -0.107 -0.277*** 0.189 -0.221*** -0.107 0.0809** 0.00679 -0.00908 
 (0.133) (0.0232) (0.308) (0.0413) (0.338) (0.0381) (0.304) (0.0376) (0.0273) (0.00619) 
Size	+,$%&  0.104 1.066*** 0.289 -0.962*** -0.411 -1.325*** -2.359*** -2.312*** 0.0164 -0.0945
*** 
 (0.273) (0.0551) (0.370) (0.0675) (0.325) (0.0759) (0.247) (0.0854) (0.0175) (0.0120) 
ROA	+,$%&  0.221*** 0.379*** -0.0230 -0.204*** -0.136** -0.326*** 0.273*** 0.184*** 0.0111
** 0.00441** 
 (0.0359) (0.0114) (0.0466) (0.0166) (0.0533) (0.0172) (0.0490) (0.0137) (0.00459) (0.00185) 
NPL	+,$%&  0.0531** 0.0927*** -0.102*** -0.144*** -0.138*** -0.196*** -0.243*** -0.296*** -0.00258 0.000464 
 (0.0213) (0.00385) (0.0265) (0.00612) (0.0330) (0.00662) (0.0393) (0.00746) (0.00555) (0.000956) 
GDP	growth	$%&  0.267 0.137
** 0.0273 0.459*** 0.0832 0.506*** -1.174*** -0.809*** -0.0395** -0.0990*** 
 (0.307) (0.0544) (0.297) (0.0933) (0.372) (0.0915) (0.270) (0.0989) (0.0192) (0.0112) 
!&M+,$%&  0.905*** 1.408*** 3.033*** 3.244*** 2.174*** 3.611*** -15.36*** -13.11*** 0.0183 0.0178
*** 
 (0.111) (0.0392) (0.210) (0.0676) (0.245) (0.0777) (0.267) (0.0805) (0.0160) (0.00658) 
Banks fixed effect  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
time fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
(& + (8  -0.403 0.429 1.050 -0.706 -0.185 -0.684 0.0501 -0.375 0.0680 0.0430 
Wald test p value 0.476 0.000 0.131 0.000 0.795 0.000 0.933 0.028 0.0953 0.0883 
r2 0.0769 0.210 0.116 0.0895 0.0761 0.130 0.625 0.542 0.415 0.525 
N 17408 249459 17181 248520 17181 248527 17408 249459 17082 237443 
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TABLE 2I: Impact of market liquidity shortages according to gap between actual and target capital using the commercial paper spread 
This table displays the impact of market liquidity shortages on the change in total capital ratio (∆TCR), on the change in asset part of risk weighted assets (∆RWA), on the change in asset part of total loans (∆LOAN), 
on the change in total assets (∆ASSET) and on dividend to total assets ratio (DIVIDEND) according to whether or not the bank is operating below its target total capital ratio.  MLSt-1 is a dummy variable that is equal 
to one if the commercial paper spread is higher than its 75th percentile at time t-1. Z!,t-1  is a dummy variable that is equal to one if bank i is more reliant on market liquidity (NSFR<100%) at time t-1 or 0 otherwise. 
size is the natural logarithm of total assets. ROA is return on asset. NPL is non-performing loans over total loans. Dummy_gap is a dummy variable equals to one if the bank is operating below its target total capital 
ratio (OMP+,$%& > 0) or 0 otherwise. GDP growth is the quarterly growth rate of GDP. M&A is a dummy variable for mergers and acquisitions. It is equal to one if the asset growth rate is lower than 10% during the 
quarter and zero otherwise. “large” corresponds to banks with total assets higher than $1 billion and “small” corresponds to banks with total assets lower or equal to $1 billion. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
*indicate statistical significance at the 10% level. **indicate statistical significance at the 5% level. ***indicate statistical significance at the 1% level. 
 ∆TCR ∆RWA ∆LOAN ∆ASSET DIVIDEND 
 LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL 
!"#$%& (w&) -0.533 0.326*** 1.031 -0.513*** -0.224 -0.546*** -0.125 -0.427** 0.0424 0.0481
* 
 (0.581) (0.0962) (0.698) (0.155) (0.720) (0.150) (0.625) (0.171) (0.0438) (0.0257) 
*+,$%& (w-) 0.141 0.111*** -0.238 -0.213*** -0.541** -0.328*** 0.0507 0.0282 0.000739 0.00427 
 (0.157) (0.0129) (0.204) (0.0226) (0.243) (0.0233) (0.184) (0.0237) (0.0196) (0.00423) 
./001_345+,$%& (w6) 0.561*** 0.380*** -0.870*** -0.861*** -0.385** -0.434*** 0.400*** 0.177*** -0.0575
*** -0.0136*** 
 (0.106) (0.0162) (0.138) (0.0317) (0.166) (0.0289) (0.145) (0.0303) (0.0148) (0.00475) 
./001_345+,$%& ∗ !"#$%& (w8) 0.162 0.129*** 0.0386 -0.272*** 0.0244 -0.158*** 0.240 0.0608 0.0327 -0.00309 
 (0.153) (0.0178) (0.239) (0.0360) (0.267) (0.0330) (0.242) (0.0370) (0.0309) (0.00539) 
Size	+,$%&  0.104 1.067*** 0.290 -0.962*** -0.411 -1.327*** -2.358*** -2.311*** 0.0165 -0.0947
*** 
 (0.274) (0.0552) (0.371) (0.0675) (0.325) (0.0760) (0.248) (0.0855) (0.0176) (0.0121) 
ROA	+,$%&  0.220*** 0.379*** -0.0229 -0.204*** -0.137** -0.325*** 0.273*** 0.184*** 0.0110
** 0.00443** 
 (0.0359) (0.0114) (0.0466) (0.0166) (0.0535) (0.0172) (0.0491) (0.0137) (0.00457) (0.00185) 
NPL	+,$%&  0.0528** 0.0920*** -0.102*** -0.143*** -0.138*** -0.195*** -0.243*** -0.296*** -0.00267 0.000520 
 (0.0214) (0.00383) (0.0265) (0.00608) (0.0331) (0.00660) (0.0394) (0.00745) (0.00553) (0.000959) 
GDP	growth	$%&  0.267 0.137
** 0.0276 0.458*** 0.0830 0.506*** -1.173*** -0.809*** -0.0395** -0.0990*** 
 (0.307) (0.0544) (0.296) (0.0933) (0.372) (0.0915) (0.270) (0.0989) (0.0192) (0.0112) 
!&M+,$%&  0.904*** 1.407*** 3.033*** 3.246*** 2.174*** 3.611*** -15.36*** -13.11*** 0.0182 0.0178
*** 
 (0.112) (0.0391) (0.210) (0.0676) (0.245) (0.0777) (0.267) (0.0805) (0.0160) (0.00657) 
Banks fixed effect  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
time fixed effect yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
w& + w8  -0.371 0.455 1.070 -0.785 -0.200 -0.704 0.116 -0.366 0.0751 0.0450 
Wald test p value 0.510 0.000 0.129 0.000 0.782 0.000 0.848 0.033 0.0835 0.0731 
r2 0.0770 0.210 0.115 0.0895 0.0760 0.130 0.625 0.542 0.415 0.525 
N 17408 249459 17181 248520 17181 248527 17408 249459 17082 237443 
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APPENDIX J: correlation matrix 
 
 
 Δtcr Δrwa Δloan Δasset Dividend Δtier MLS_ted MLS_cp Z_nsfr Z_rwf Z_LTCD Z_liq dummy_gap dummy_gap_one size roa npl GDP growth M&A 
Δtcr 1                   
Δrwa -0.399 1                  
Δloan -0.272 0.676 1                 
Δasset -0.329 -0.215 -0.248 1                
Dividend -0.031 0.008 0.010 -0.009 1               
Δtier 0.992 -0.394 -0.272 -0.328 -0.032 1              
MLS_ted -0.046 0.021 0.033 0.047 0.024 -0.048 1             
MLS_cp -0.050 0.029 0.039 0.059 0.038 -0.051 0.866 1            
Z_nsfr 0.054 -0.036 -0.046 -0.061 -0.154 0.053 0.034 0.016 1           
Z_rwf -0.007 -0.009 -0.006 0.056 -0.059 -0.008 0.065 0.063 0.157 1          
Z_LTCD -0.037 0.025 0.046 0.097 -0.034 -0.040 0.147 0.143 0.145 0.353 1         
Z_liq 0.003 0.075 0.108 -0.005 -0.042 0.001 0.098 0.105 0.164 0.284 0.397 1        
dummy_gap 0.099 -0.057 -0.043 -0.011 -0.082 0.098 -0.030 -0.023 0.236 0.234 0.223 0.343 1       
dummy_gap_one 0.102 -0.056 -0.045 -0.015 -0.084 0.102 -0.037 -0.029 0.245 0.235 0.222 0.343 0.933 1      
size 0.061 -0.037 -0.047 0.010 -0.188 0.060 -0.031 -0.037 0.322 0.317 0.125 0.207 0.388 0.386 1     
roa 0.221 -0.046 -0.076 -0.049 0.043 0.225 -0.045 -0.013 -0.074 -0.041 -0.064 0.023 0.006 0.004 0.063 1    
npl 0.059 -0.074 -0.085 -0.180 -0.058 0.057 -0.054 -0.101 0.354 0.069 0.025 0.002 0.114 0.119 0.121 -0.339 1   
GDP growth 0.000 0.069 0.077 -0.015 0.023 0.003 -0.335 -0.236 -0.079 -0.047 -0.083 -0.028 0.002 0.003 -0.038 0.122 -0.131 1  
M&A 0.272 0.101 0.101 -0.696 -0.006 0.272 -0.036 -0.041 0.058 -0.050 -0.086 0.019 0.052 0.055 0.028 0.137 0.080 0.010 1 
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APPENDIX K:  
This table presents the components and weights used to calculate the Net Stable Funding Ratio. ASF is available stable funding and RSF is required stable 
funding. 
Components of ASF weight % Components of RSF 
weight 
% 
Total equity 100 Loans to Depository Institutions & Acceptances of Other Banks 100 
Subordinated notes and debentures  Loans Non-Depository Financial Institutions and All Other Loans  
Time deposits of less than $100,000 with remaining maturity one year or more  Total Trading Assets  
Time deposits of $100,000 through $250,000 with remaining maturity one year or more  Premises & Fixed Assets  
Time deposits of more than $250,000 with remaining maturity one year or more  Total OREO  
Federal Home Loan Bank advances with remaining maturity more than a year  Investments in unconsolidated subsidiaries  
Other borrowings with remaining maturity more than a year  Direct and Indirect Investments in Real Estate Ventures  
Transaction deposits of Individuals, Partnerships, & Corporations 95 Total Intangible Assets  
Other Savings Deposits  nonperforming loans  
Non-brokered time deposits of less than $100,000 with remaining maturity less than one year  Total Other Assets  
Non-brokered time deposits of $100,000 through $250,00 with remaining maturity less than one year  1–4 family mortgages 85 
MMDAs 90 Loans secured by real estate excluding 1–4 family mortgages  
Non-brokered time deposits more than $250,000 with remaining maturity less than one year  Agricultural Production Loans  
Non-retail transaction deposits 50 commercial and industrial loans  
Brokered time deposits with remaining maturity less than a year  Consumer Loans  
Federal Home Loan Bank advances with a remaining maturity of one year or less  Total Lease Financing Receivables  
Other borrowings with remaining maturity one year or less  non-U.S. Government Loans 65 
Other Liabilities 0 Obligations of states and political subdivisions in the U. S  
Total Trading Liabilities  Mortgage-backed securities 50 
Fed Funds Purchased  Asset-backed securities and financial products  
Repurchase Agreements  Other debt securities  
  Total Marketable Equity Securities  
  Fed Funds Sold  
  Reverse Repurchase Agreements  
  US Government agency obligations 15 
  Securities issued by State & political subdivisions in the US  
  U.S. Treasury Securities 5 
  Total Unused Commitments  
  Financial Standby LOC  
  Performance Standby LOC  
  commercial LOC  
  Total Cash & Balances Due Depository Institutions 0 
 
